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ABSTRACT 
 
Technological changes have always been subject to numerous debates and studies 
to establish if and how much they benefit society. Glyphosate resistant soybean can be 
seen as such a technological improvement that has generated numerous studies 
attempting to measure the welfare gains. There are obvious gains from adopting the 
technology from a production efficiency standpoint, as it significantly decreases 
production cost and simplifies weed control management. However, with some 
consumers being reluctant to embrace such a change, especially in Europe, it is not 
obvious that overall welfare gains are positive. This study attempts to address some 
shortcomings perceived in recent economic literature, namely the disregard of 
consumers’ demand responses and the lack of analysis over time. 
A partial equilibrium model is created where supply and demand functions are 
estimated based on observed prices and quantities, the adoption rate of the new 
technology, and production information such as yield and harvested areas. The model 
developed considers 6 different regions, namely the U.S., Europe, China, Argentina, 
Brazil and the rest of the world, and develops for each one of them a supply function and 
three demand functions for soybean grain, meal and oil. Once those are calibrated, the 
gains for the different players in the industry are computed. 
The findings are that the gains are proportionally allocated to the different 
consumers based on the share of the demand for the specific country. Price supports in 
the U.S. in the early years provide, proportionally to the adoption rate, more gains to the 
consumers. Producers gain or lose from the technology depending on whether they have 
  
adopted it or not. Countries like the U.S. or Argentina, who were the earlier adopters, 
definitely see an increase in their producer surplus from the adoption of the technology. 
Countries such as Brazil, which have delayed adopting the technology for political 
reasons, have faced a significant loss due to lower prices without the benefits of enjoying 
a cost-saving production technology. The innovator’s gain increases over time as the 
adoption rate rises.  
From a country perspective, the U.S. is without doubt the country that has 
benefited the most from the technology. The main reasons are that the U.S. has the largest 
acreage of soybean that is grown using the Glyphosate resistant technology. The U.S. 
consumer base for soybean products is the largest and the monopoly is a U.S.-based 
company. Therefore some of the gain captured abroad by the monopoly funnels into the 
U.S.  
This study finds that, from 2002 to 2005, even if the European consumer 
completely stopped purchasing soybean, the U.S. as a whole would still benefit from the 
technology. For the earlier period 1998-2005, the study finds that if Europe had 
decreased its demand from 35% to 48%, there would have been a possibility for the U.S. 
as a whole to have been made worse off by the technology.  
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CHAPTER 1 - Problem Identification & Explanation 
 
Since their introduction in 1996, Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) have 
been the fuel of much controversy. In Europe, strong opponents of the technology 
regularly perform illegal actions, from swathing experimental fields to trespassing into 
warehouses containing genetically modified seeds. Citizens in Europe are starting to 
become concerned as reflected in numerous polls. Media coverage is often used as a 
proxy to gauge how much interest a subject has in public opinion. In the written press, the 
coverage has been somewhat moderate in the United States, with only 383 articles 
addressing biotechnology in 2001-2002 in the Washington Post, the New York Times and 
the Wall Street Journal (Thomson and Dininni, 2005). In Europe, GMOs have taken a 
more prominent position in the media with, 385 articles related to GMOs being published 
within the same period by the European newspaper, Le Monde, alone. This shows that 
biotechnology is an important topic in the minds of European consumers. It also shows 
that policy makers have complex decisions to make regarding the development of 
Genetically Modified (GM) crops.  
As Hebden et al. (2005) described, the United States, in allowing the production 
of GM crops, has been facing mixed responses from its trading partners. Exports to South 
Korea dropped significantly and other countries such as, Australia, New Zealand, China, 
Japan, and members of the European Union (E.U.) have imposed restrictions on imports 
and implemented mandatory GM labeling systems (Hebden et al., 2005). The E.U. and 
other countries have been opposing the U.S. and other adopters of the technology in the 
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World Trade Organization (WTO) framework for some time and a resolution does not 
appear to be in sight. European consumers want to see a labeling of the product they 
consume if it contains genetically modified material. Consequently, grocery stores have 
started to move in that direction and label the products to address consumers’ concerns 
(Lapan and Moschini, 2004).  
While a WTO judgment made the E.U. moratorium on GM approval illegal 
(Bloomberg, 2006), it does not directly incriminate labeling. Indeed, Europe had been 
very slow to approve GM products to be sold or produced in its territory. In 1998 the 
approval process slowed down significantly; therefore, a large number of GM products 
have never been approved since then. While the WTO resolution appears to force Europe 
to start to more effectively approve GM products, it does not seem to condemn labeling. 
This means that the European consumers should have enough information to make an 
educated choice regarding GM food versus non-GM food consumption.  
It is, therefore, important to identify what gains are really to be achieved by 
producers who adopt this new technology in the U.S. If the gains from improved 
production efficiency outweigh the loss in markets then it would be in producers’ best 
interest to continue to move toward adoption. On the other hand, if the efficiency benefits 
from the technology are smaller than the lost markets, or if the efficiency gains are 
captured primarily by seed companies exercising market power, then it might not be in 
the farmers’ best interest to move in the GM direction. Many studies have considered 
GM crops from a theoretical standpoint (Falck-Zepeda, 2000; Moschini et al., 2000; 
Sobolevsky et al., 2005) but many empirical questions remain. 
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 This research will focus on the economic effect of the introduction of genetically 
modified soybean, specifically the variety modified for Glyphosate resistance.1 With 
almost 10 years of background information, it is possible to estimate how the supply of 
soybean has shifted due to the introduction of the GM technology. Since GM technology 
is under intellectual property protection, innovator firms have market power and therefore 
the methodology developed by Moschini and Lapan (1997) will be used to estimate the 
repartition of welfare among the different sectors of the soybean industry and soybean 
consumers. A sensitivity analysis will then be elaborated and will demonstrate whether it 
is possible that the changes are immiserizing (if, because of trade distortions, the overall 
gains from innovation are not positive) and, if they are not, what kind of trade distortion 
would be necessary to annihilate the technological gains. These are important issues due 
to the increased usage of genetically modified crops in the United States and the 
reluctance of some major importers such, as Europe, to let those products come into their 
markets without specific labeling.  
The genetically modified soybean is widely adopted in the United States and 
represents almost 90% of the planted soybean acres in 2005 (Figure 1).  
 
                                                 
1 Glyphosate is a herbicide that was sold under the brand name Roundup by Monsanto, who was 
the sole seller up to the end of 2000. Also note that Monsanto was the developer of the Glyphosate resistant 
soybean, which it sells under the brand name “Roundup Ready soybean”. The patent given to Monsanto for 
that product will expire in August 2007. 
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Source: http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/BiotechCrops/ 
Figure 1: Adoption of genetically engineered crops grown in the U.S. 
 
Figure 2 shows how the export value of U.S. soybean to the E.U. varied over 
time. E.U. imports of U.S. soybean significantly decreased since 1997, from $2.3 billion 
in 1997 to $585 million in 2005. 
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Source: USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 
Figure 2: Value of U.S. soybean exports to Europe over time 
 
The primary objective of this study is to estimate the repartition of welfare gains 
due to the introduction of Glyphosate resistant soybean. In order to do so, the supply shift 
and demand shift will have to be calculated to measure producer as well as consumer 
welfare gains. There are also welfare consequences for seed producers and innovating 
companies that will need to be assessed. Indeed, because of the patenting of the 
technology, the innovator is allowed to act as a monopoly for a period of time. Finally, 
the model to be utilized in this study will assess the effect of potential customer 
resistance on the current level of welfare and, in particular, the reduction in demand from 
international markets needed that would make soybean producers in the U.S. worse off 
because of the introduction of the new technology. This study also will consider the 
welfare impacts of the technology adoption over time. It will not limit itself to one single 
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year but will look at the entire period 1998-2005. When analyzing the soybean industry, 
it is important to consider the overall soybean complex, which is made of soybean grain, 
soybean oil and soybean meal. The welfare consequences on the soybean complex will be 
measured for different parts of the world, namely the U.S., the E.U., China, Argentina, 
Brazil and all the other countries combined under Rest of the World (ROW). In a context 
where countries have adopted different policies concerning biotechnology adoption or 
consumption, it is important to treat those countries individually. The tasks that will be 
accomplished through this study are as follows: 
 Development of an economic model that is flexible enough to capture changes in 
soybean supply and demand. 
 Calibration of the model to determine parameter values in the demand and supply 
functions. 
  Estimation of monopoly profit from the Glyphosate resistant technology. 
 Calculation of welfare change for the following groups: U.S. producers and 
consumers, South American producers and consumers, rest of the world producers 
and consumers. 
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CHAPTER 2 - Literature Review 
 
The literature concerning GM food and its economic implications is quite 
abundant because it presents numerous challenges for economists due to the complexity 
of the subject. For clarity, this literature review will be organized along different themes. 
First, GM grains’ acceptance by consumers has generated several studies, for which the 
main findings will be summarized. Second, the review will focus on studies that deal with 
producer adoption of this new technique as well as the factors that encourage or 
discourage adoption. Third, several research projects that have focused on welfare gains 
due to this innovation, as well as the distribution of the gains, will be explored. Fourth, 
because producers’ welfare gains are linked to the supply shift, research on previous 
supply shifts due to technological improvements will also be addressed. Emphasis will be 
placed on the effect of assumptions concerning supply shifts and their consequences on 
producer surplus calculations. Finally, this review will consider studies on the welfare 
effects of innovation in the presence of distortionary policies – specifically the conditions 
under which a technological shift can have negative effects due to trade distortion. Of 
particular interest is the research concerning GM crops and trade distortions. 
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Consumer Attitudes Toward GMOs 
 
GM foods have been a focus of numerous consumer studies over the last decade. 
Studies vary from trying to model consumers’ aversion to GMOs (Springer et al. 2005) to 
labeling issues of products susceptible to containing GM material (Crespi and Marette, 
2003). 
Yearley (2001) explained the difference in consumers’ acceptance of GM 
products as a result of the uncertainty associated with those products. He stated that the 
difficulty in analyzing consumer behavior resides in the fact that “the nature or the extent 
of the underlying uncertainties are themselves unknown” (p.151). For instance, when a 
risk is known and well documented, consumers can make judgments based on statistical 
evidence and therefore have a statistical basis to refer to. In the case of Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy, for instance, because there was so much unknown about 
prions at the time, there was no statistical foundation to analyze the new technology 
(which consisted of feeding protein from dead animals to cows). Yearley’s suggestion 
toward risk analysis is to develop a multi-criteria mapping that will, contrary to the usual 
techniques, not boil down risk perceptions to a few opinions but maintain the diversity of 
the risk approaches by evaluating different options and therefore making values and 
judgments explicit. This method functions as follows: “Representatives of key groups or 
key individuals are invited to formulate the options, the criteria and the weightings; the 
options are then scored against the criteria by experts, and the weightings applied. The 
most popular or least unpopular options can then be identified, and it is hard for the 
participants to disaffiliate themselves from the process since they are held to have been 
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constitutive in setting up the options and in attaching the relative weights in the first 
place” (p.156). 
Gaskell et al. (1999) attempted to answer the question of why European 
consumers seemed to exhibit different preferences toward GMOs than American 
consumers. They showed that consumers have different preferences when it comes to 
GM crops or GM food versus GM testing or GM medicines. They showed that American 
consumers are not necessarily more favorable to GM food than European consumers but 
overall there is a higher resistance level in Europe than in the U.S. While their study tried 
to explain consumer resistance based on the level of information proxy by media 
coverage, trust in institutions, and knowledge about biotechnology, they could not come 
up with a single explanation “for the greater resistance to food biotechnology in Europe” 
(p.386). Indeed, media coverage, while more abundant in Europe in 1996, was more 
positive than in the U.S. but the population was more reluctant towards GM food. While 
it is commonly accepted that scientific knowledge supports technology and innovation, 
this does not hold in the case of GM organisms. Only 4 out of 17 European countries had 
a lower population scientific knowledge than the U.S. but still GM organisms were not 
more favored than in the U.S. Finally, the third factor presented by Gaskell et al. is the 
trust in institutions: “Trust in the regulatory authorities is higher in the United States than 
in Europe” (p.386).   
Terawaki (2005) used a similar approach to estimate the effects of the scientific 
information provided by the Japanese government on consumers’ acceptance of GM corn 
oil in the form of their willingness to pay. He found that, while information seemed to 
reduce the variance component of the willingness to pay for GM corn oil, the level of 
 10 
information did not seem to reduce the mean component. This implies that no matter the 
level of information, it does not change intrinsically how much the average consumer is 
willing to pay for such a good.  
Huffman (2003) also studied the effect of information on consumers’ behavior 
concerning GM foods. He found that third party information from sources between the 
extremes of biotechnology companies and environmental groups might be perceived as a 
more objective information source. This would lead to less resistance to GM foods and 
might help “greatly improve future social welfare” (p.1117).  
Springer et al. (2005) noted that, despite the numerous studies attempting to 
explain acceptance of GM food based on socio-economic factors or the way consumers 
are educated and the information that is distilled to them, there were still many unknown 
factors that seemed to be involved in consumer acceptance of GM products. They argued 
that the type of values present in a society and the correlation between these values and 
GM acceptance would be an important explanatory factor. The values in their survey 
were: self-direction, achievement, benevolence, conformity, stimulation, tradition, and 
universalism. These values were assessed by quantifying the importance each value had 
to each respondent. By looking at Greece and Germany, two European countries that 
have relatively different societal values, the researchers concluded that in a society where 
social norms are important, people will mainly rely on “beliefs and perceptions, which 
carry on family norms and traditions” (Springer et al., 2005). The implication of this for 
GM food is that in a society that emphasizes self-direction and stimulation as opposed to 
tradition, security and conformity, people will have a more scientific outlook in the 
formation of attitudes, primarily by using a cost-benefit approach. Conversely, in other 
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societies, acceptance will take longer as it will be based upon the perception of others’ 
attitudes toward the new technology. 
In a study attempting to measure consumers’ willingness to pay for non-GM 
foods, Gifford et al. (2005) showed that there was a portion of the U.S. population that 
was willing to pay a 20 to 30% premium for food that will be certified non-GM. 
However, they pointed out that this share might be a hard target to reach for marketers as 
the researchers were not able to isolate particular socioeconomic characteristics that 
would significantly and consistently lead to a higher willingness to pay for non-GM 
foods. 
Despite all the resistance that seems to exist around the world towards GM crops, 
Aldrich and Blisard (1998) asserted that we should look at the rbST experience as an 
example and take it into consideration when studying GM food acceptance. rbST is a 
laboratory-produced growth hormone that increases milk production. Similar to GM 
foods, its introduction generated significant resistance among consumers, with studies 
forecasting a drop in milk demand of 4% to 20%. With the passage of time since the 
introduction of rbST, none of the predicted negative reactions actually occurred. 
Therefore, from consumers’ perspective, the market did not appear to have been affected 
despite the fact that consumers were concerned about this technique. The authors believe 
that the results should be similar with GM foods and that despite concerns, GM foods 
will still be consumed as long as there is an absence of reported harm. 
Fulton and Giannakas (2004) and Crespi and Marette (2003) show the importance 
of consumer preferences while looking at the effect of GMOs on consumer welfare. 
Those studies focus primarily on labeling issues and show the complexity involved in the 
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process of informing the consumer. Indeed, depending on the consumer sensibilities 
toward GM foods, mandatory labeling of GM products may be beneficial in the case 
where a large number of the population is concerned about the food they eat. Conversely, 
if the number of people concerned about food is low, then voluntarily labeling GM-free 
food might be the welfare-maximizing solution (Crespi and Marette, 2003). Fulton and 
Giannakas (2004) add to the labeling issue the fact that the market power of “life science 
companies” is important when determining consumers’ preferences for different labeling 
options.  
The studies presented have demonstrated that because there is some uncertainty 
associated with GM crops that cannot be quantified, and because risk levels are unknown, 
consumers have different acceptance levels of GM foods. Several studies have attempted 
to characterize the factors that would lead to such a difference. Those factors become 
difficult to pinpoint; beside the classical socioeconomic factors or sources of information, 
a part of consumer acceptance appears to be characterized by consumers’ cultural values. 
Researchers have not yet been able to specifically isolate the consumer characteristics 
that would make an individual against or in favor of GM food.   
 
Producers’ Attitudes Toward GMOs 
 
GM crops provide various benefits based on farm location as well as weed or pest 
infestation (Fernandez-Cornejo et al., 2000). Apparently these benefits were sufficiently 
large to overcome producers’ concerns about environmental and food safety impacts, as 
demonstrated by a rapid adoption rate. The main reason found in Fernandez-Cornejo et 
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al.’s study on the adoption of GM crops in the U.S. was the small but statistically 
significant increase in yield as well as lower herbicide costs provided by this new 
technology. Fernandez-Cornejo et al.’s (2002) analysis looked also at GM adoption 
characteristics but this specific study is based on a larger database with the availability of 
two additional years of data compared to the 2000 study. Herbicide resistant crops have 
been widely accepted by producer populations in the U.S., with adoption rates up to 68%, 
at the time of their study, for Glyphosate resistant soybean. On the other hand, Bt 
resistant crops (crop resistant to corn-borer) have been less attractive for farmers as their 
adoption rates have leveled off and may even be decreasing in places in the U.S. The 
study concluded that adoption of herbicide resistant corn or cotton translates into a 
positive, statistically significant impact on financial performance. However, herbicide 
resistant soybean did not seem to have the same positive impact on financial 
performance. Finally, they concluded by showing that the adoption of herbicide resistant 
crops translated to a slight reduction in aggregate pesticide use.  
Characteristics that affect farmers’ decisions to plant GM crops have been the 
focus of numerous studies. Chimmiry et al., in their study of Illinois farmers, found that 
operations for which the manager has a positive attitude toward GM food have a 
tendency to plant more acres to GM crops. On the other hand, farmers that have a more 
negative perception of GM organisms have a smaller probability of planting GM crops. 
Finally, if GM crops are viewed as providing microeconomic benefits (such as yield or 
profit improvements) to farmers then it increases the probability that they will plant 
genetically enhanced crops.  
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Saak and Hennessy (2002) looked at producer behavior from a different 
perspective and analyzed how the uncertainty associated with GM food markets affected 
planting decisions. If at planting time there is some uncertainty concerning the market 
price of the crop following harvest, and price discounts may occur because certain 
markets are resistant to GM foods, fewer acres of GM crops are planted than otherwise. 
Kalaitzandonakes (2002) similarly notes that “short term market realities and institutions 
… will have a significant impact on the rate and the direction of agribiotechnology 
research and product development” (p-1232). He also foresees the United States as 
keeping its strategic position and its leadership emphasizing the fact that industries are 
always fairly reactive to market signaling. For instance, if there is a premium to be made 
from non-GM soybean, the private sector will organize itself in such a way that it can 
capture that extra premium. 
Supply shifts have occurred frequently in agriculture and have attracted the 
interest of many economists. Lemieux and Wohlgenant (1989), Schutz (1956) and Qaim 
(1999) studied production shifts in U.S. hogs, U.S. oranges and Mexican potatoes, 
respectively. Lemieux and Wohlgenant showed that the introduction of PST (pork growth 
hormone, porcine somatotropin) could produce benefits to producers and that its adoption 
was very sensitive to lagged adjustments in production as well as changes in product 
quality. Schutz explained that the introduction of a new technology that allows 
processing of oranges into concentrates may have had mixed effects on orange growers. 
Indeed, the period following the introduction of the process showed increased price 
volatility despite the constant increases in production. Qaim presented the tremendous 
impacts that viral resistant potatoes could have on the Mexican potato industry. He also 
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showed how poorer countries could benefit from biotechnology research by investing in 
international research in order to have access to the genetic technology that would allow 
them to be able to develop their own domestic technology. 
By looking at the few research findings presented above, GM crops present 
numerous advantages for farmers and that is the main reason they are so widely adopted. 
GM crops with lower adoption rates appear to have fairly localized benefits and do not 
seem to generate widespread improvements. Generally most technological improvements 
are capable of improving producers’ situations. However, care needs to be taken as 
uncertainty on the demand side may offset these benefits. 
 
Effects of Technological Improvements on Welfare 
 
Technological changes are bound to happen over time. Very likely they will be 
resisted by part of the population as they can have adverse effects on certain groups. Just 
et al.(1979) explain that because of technological changes, some people will gain and 
some people will lose. In the case of perfect competition without market distortions and 
externalities, the overall welfare of the world should increase because of those changes. 
Technological changes that have the largest welfare effects usually improve the 
productivity of a scarce factor, which generally allows for an increase in output. 
However, one of the side-effects, sometimes unwanted, is that technological innovation 
may change the location of production. 
In 1982 Freebairn et al. showed that the welfare gains from research are 
distributed along the production and supply chain from producers to consumers. They 
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applied their theoretical model to the hog industry and showed that research at different 
levels of the supply chain benefits all players as well as the consumer. The model they 
developed assumes perfect competition but they extended their result to a situation where 
perfect competition would not be the case. The monopoly or firm with market power 
would then reap more of the benefits from research than the other players, but there still 
should be an overall gain to each of the players. Alston and Scobie commented that the 
strong assumptions made by Freebairn et al. (such as a zero elasticity of substitution 
between inputs, linear supply and demand functions and a parallel shift due to technology 
improvements) resulted in a loss of the benefits that marketing stages have had on 
production. 
As early as 1972, Bieri et al. suggested that, when looking at how research affects 
the distribution of gains, studies often failed to take into account the structure of the 
sectors involved: i.e., input suppliers to agriculture, the agricultural production sector, 
and the food distributing and consuming sector. Because each technological innovation is 
specific and will affect each sector differently, care should be taken when analyzing the 
welfare gains generated by different technological improvements. Specifically, each 
sector should be looked at individually. 
Edwards and Freebairn (1984) looked also at the repartition of welfare gains by 
taking into account the different sectors involved. They also accounted for the effects on 
the rest of the world’s consumers and producers. They concluded that for a country that 
wants to maximize the social benefits from research, resources should be invested in 
research that affects imported commodities. By doing so, production costs of these 
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commodities would decrease and therefore generate welfare gains in the rest of the world 
as well, which in turn would increase the demand for exported goods.  
Gallagher (1998) presented a story with different nuances. He looked at a 
hypothetical GM soybean that would have different properties, namely higher oil content 
but less yield per acre. According to his model, this would result in no welfare gains, 
mainly due to the substitution effects toward other oil sources. In order to reach welfare 
gains, both yield and quality need to increase. Nevertheless, the yield effect should be 
pursued more aggressively as it ends up dominating the quality characteristics of the 
grains.  
When talking about technological improvements, it is important to consider 
whether those improvements are input sensitive. Indeed, as Offutt et al. (1987) pointed 
out, technological improvements would be sensitive to land quality, as was the case in 
their study of Illinois corn. They recommend that, while trying to evaluate new 
technology, the researcher must be sensitive to regional differences as gains would likely 
be different from one region to another.  
Carmen Fernandez Dias (2005), in a welfare study of the GM situation in Europe, 
argued that without mandatory labeling consumers in Europe would have been made 
worse off. Her theoretical model attempted to represent the real organization of the 
market. First the seed market, because of concentration and patent, was assumed to be 
monopolistically competitive. The production market, represented by farmers, and the 
transformation market, where raw grain products were transformed into food, were both 
assumed to be competitive. The study, solely theoretical, assumed a shift in the demand 
of food due to the introduction of GM products. This allowed for the assumption that 
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consumers would have a positive Willingness To Pay (WTP) for non GM products and 
therefore part of the productivity gains from GM crops may be lost due to a weaker 
demand. She explains that if there is no labeling, there would be a welfare loss, because 
of higher prices due to the European market intervention that prevents prices within the 
E.U. from falling below a certain level, and also because of the “monopolist power of 
seed suppliers that prevents the transmission of cost savings” (p.15). Because of 
consumers being so sensitive to GM food, the presence of information, such as labeling, 
allows both GM food and non GM food consumers to be better off in her model.  
Wilson et al (2005) did a thorough empirical study of the welfare consequences of 
introducing GM wheat. Their research took into account the supply shift due to the 
introduction of the new technology. They also took into account market acceptance 
nationally and internationally. They allowed for market segmentation and included the 
extra costs due to the requirements of segregating the different products. Based on the 
scenario they accepted as being the most likely, they showed a producer annual surplus 
gain of $301 million and a consumer surplus increase of $252 million in the U.S.  
When computing producer or consumer surplus, Lindner and Jarett (1978) 
emphasized the importance of knowing the kind of supply shift that occurs. A parallel 
shift versus a convergent or a divergent supply shift will generate different results. Wise 
and Fell (1980) in their comments pointed out a mathematical flaw in the previous study 
but agreed on the fact that special care should be given when choosing the elasticities of 
demand and of supply. 
Alston et al. (1983) noticed that, very often when welfare gains were calculated, 
perfect competition was assumed and may lead researchers to erroneous answers. They 
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developed a conceptual framework, based on conjectural variations, that allowed for 
imperfect competition and therefore were able to account for oligopsony, oligopoly, or 
even both. By using conjectural variations theory, they were able to introduce model 
parameters that represented the level of market power exhibited on the supply or on the 
demand side. Those parameters had the convenient properties of being bounded between 
0 and 1, with the extremes representing no market power and full monopoly/monopsony, 
respectively. Using their model in an imperfect competition situation allowed them to 
draw conclusions regarding the benefit distribution due to innovation.  
First they explained that, as shown in previous literature, a parallel shift of the 
supply curve would provide the same gains as the perfectly competitive market minus the 
increase in dead weight loss due to the presence of market power. The innovation 
benefits in that case are strictly dependent on the two elasticities, the market power 
coefficients in the two sectors, and the producers’ share of the price of the final good.  
Second, they showed that a pivotal shift of supply has the potential of decreasing 
the dead weight loss. This does not mean that the market is less distorted, but it means 
that more gains are captured. Their main finding was that, by increasing the oligopsony 
or oligopoly power, the gains would tend to migrate toward the sector that had the most 
market power. This suggests that research investments may not always achieve the 
desired goal.  
Zhao et al. (1997) also brought up some interesting points to take into 
consideration when attempting to measure welfare changes. They used an equilibrium 
displacement model and looked at how much the choice of functional form affected the 
results of welfare gains or losses. They found that, when supply and demand were locally 
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linear, estimates were exact. If the supply and demand were locally log linear functions 
then the percentage change needed to be estimated as a difference of logs to be able to 
obtain exact results. If parallel shifts were assumed, then the errors would be small as 
long as the exogenous shift was small. However, the errors could be significant in the 
case of constant elasticity functional forms. 
Although innovation generally leads to welfare improvements, previously 
presented studies provide interesting perspectives on technological changes and welfare 
relationships. Indeed, most agree that technological changes lead to welfare 
improvements. However, measuring those changes is not always an easy task as different 
factors need to be taken into consideration, such as functional form, effect on inputs use, 
type of supply shift, and the presence of market power. 
 
Intellectual Property Right Effect on Economic Welfare 
 
GM technology has introduced a new concept in agriculture, intellectual property 
rights. Indeed, users of GM seeds cannot replant the seeds from one year to another as 
they used to do for non hybrid crops. This is prevented due to the fact that innovator 
companies like Monsanto have obtained a patent on a genetic technology that confers to 
the plant certain properties. This is important to take into account while measuring 
welfare changes as it puts the holder of the intellectual property rights in a monopoly 
situation. Falck-Zepeda et al. (1997), Moschini and Lapan (1997), Langford (1997), 
Lence et al. (2005) and Graff et al. (2003) all studied the implication of intellectual 
property rights on rent creation and welfare distribution as well as technology transfers.  
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Regarding genetic material Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), Langford (1997) 
suggested that, while IPR are a necessary condition in order to attract private funding, a 
system needs to be put in place (eventually publicly financed) to maintain biodiversity 
and genetic patrimony. He concluded by saying that intellectual property rights give an 
incentive to investors to have more money invested in research. But he also said that, 
potentially, the interest of Third World countries would be to invest at the international 
level to guide and lead to discoveries from which they could benefit. Research findings 
then could be transportable and applicable to those countries. Once transformed and 
rationally sound for the population, this technology would improve national welfare. 
Graff et al. (2003) explained that biotechnology is transforming the world of 
research in agriculture, especially the interaction between publicly and privately funded 
research. They discussed that, while intellectual property rights allow start-up companies 
to develop and to bear the risk of developing a new technology, such rights may also 
constrain future innovation in the private and in the public sector. IPR might also lead to 
new types of complementarities between private and public research.  
Lence et al. (2005) looked at intellectual property rights and their effects over 
time. They started from the postulate that grain farmers would buy those improved inputs 
as long as they were cheaper than the profit premium farmers could expect from them. 
This would influence the cost structure of production and therefore affect the grain 
market itself. Taking into account the length of time the intellectual property rights are in 
effect before competition will take place, they showed that the optimal duration of 
intellectual property right protection is not really sensitive to the parameters but more to 
the productivity of the research and development sector. For a longer period of 
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intellectual property right protection, consumer and producer welfare were not as high as 
for a shorter period. They concluded by saying that reducing the intellectual property 
period would bring more welfare to other sectors besides the seed industry. 
Moschini and Lapan (1997) explain that traditional methods for calculating 
consumer and producer surplus cannot be applied in the case of GM crops, because the 
input market for producers is not competitive. Much of the research in the U.S. received 
public funds in the past and therefore the issue of proprietary information did not arise. 
As more research was privatized, more of the findings become the property of a firm that 
is given intellectual property rights to protect its discovery. Pricing for the new input is 
then bounded by, on the one hand, a price so high that producers would use a substitute, 
and on the other hand, the (low) price of the regular product where the monopoly would 
not make any profits from their innovation.  
The model they developed assumes a competitive market on the output side and 
market power on the input side. In this framework, total welfare gain can be computed by 
aggregating the traditional Marshallian surplus measured on the output market and the 
monopoly profit generated in the input market. From simulations, Moschini and Lapan 
found that, while classical methods may not be too inaccurate for measuring the overall 
welfare gain from technology, they might fail to accurately allocate the welfare gains 
across market sectors. “What is conventionally measured as benefits to consumers and 
agricultural producers could in fact be largely captured by the innovating firms” 
(Moschini and Lapan, 1997, p.1241). 
Falck-Zepeda et al.(2000) studied the welfare distribution due to Bt technology on 
cotton and generated preliminary estimates for Glyphosate resistant soybean for 1997. 
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They used the model first developed by Moschini and Lapan in 1997 to attribute the 
distribution of the rent due to GM technology. The model used is based on linear supply 
and demand, and they assumed a parallel shift of supply due to the introduction of the 
new technology. By invoking the Law of One Price, they assumed that prices in different 
regions differ only by transportation costs. This allowed them to convert the 
counterfactual world price (world price that would have been observed without the 
introduction of GMOs) to a percentage change in price. This permits regional price 
diversity and differences in regional production characteristics - i.e. local yields as well 
as cost savings induced by the new technology. Production data used are from the 1997 
ARMS survey and elasticities are taken from previous literature. The model is calibrated 
to the year 1997. They found that, for Bt cotton, farmers captured 42% of additional 
rents, Monsanto through the licensing fee captured 35%, Delta and Pine Land Company 
(the seed company) 9%, consumers 7%, and the rest of the world 6%. Concerning 
soybean, the results were very sensitive to the elasticity chosen for the U.S. supply. Using 
Taylor’s (1993) elasticity, they found 76% for US farmers, 4% for U.S. consumers, 9% 
for the rest of the world, and 10% for the innovator. Using Williams’ (1998) elasticity 
they found that U.S. farmers captured 29%, U.S. consumers 17%, rest of the world 28%, 
with 25% of the total rent going to the innovator. 
Moschini et al. (2000) used the model developed by Moschini and Lapan (1997) 
as the basis for their evaluation of the welfare effects in the soybean complex due to 
Glyphosate resistant soybean. The model was different in that it represented more 
accurately the reality of planting decisions made by farmers so that the choice variable 
was not the seed rate, but the number of soybean acres planted. The innovation could 
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therefore affect overall supply of soybean either by increasing the planted acreage of 
soybean or by increasing yield.  
They also introduced regional characteristics to represent the production 
differences between regions of the world as well as varying abilities to enforce IPR in 
different growing regions.  They identified three regions defined as the U.S., South 
America and the Rest of the World (ROW). They noted that South America produces 
about as much oil and meal as the United States, but had a larger share of export markets. 
Europe mainly imports soybean meal, but is a net oil exporter. They also pointed out that, 
while China was the largest oil importer, its market was geographically separated from 
the other regions.  
The model was constructed by assuming that farmers were profit maximizers, so 
that any increase in yield due to the new technology is converted to a cost saving. Once 
this assumption was made and the profit function established, the supply function for 
soybean can be derived. This soybean supply function faced three demand functions, the 
demand of soybean grain, oil and meal. Holding transportation and crushing costs 
constant, they were able to write the spatial market equilibrium conditions so that 
quantity produced and imported in one region minus quantity exported was equal to the 
quantity demanded for the specific region. The model was calibrated using price and 
quantities for the 1997-1998 year.  
Other parameters such as the price differential between soybean products, as well 
as cost savings due to the technology, were calculated either using previous literature or 
Extension-based information. Imposing no change in stocks, they looked at different 
adoption rate scenarios in each of the three regions defined previously. They concluded 
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that the gains generated by Glyphosate resistant soybean were important. Those gains 
decreased, for the United States the more the technology was transferred abroad. Indeed, 
U.S. farmers lost some of their competitive edge versus the rest of the world producers. 
Gains could be lessened even more if IPR enforcements were weak overseas.   
Price et al. (2003) presented a compelling study as they acknowledged and 
summarized the previous work that has been done on welfare gains generated by GM 
technology for soybean. They used Falck-Zepeda et al.’s (2000) model as their 
framework but adapted it “to better reflect commodity flows and trade patterns” (p.20). 
They used a linear equilibrium model and estimated a supply shift by estimating the cost 
saving per acre of soybean planted. Once the shift was estimated, they used demand and 
supply elasticities for the U.S. and the rest of the world to generate the net welfare effect 
to producers, consumers, innovator for the U.S. and the rest of the world. They found that 
the gain to the world in 1997 from the adoption of Glyphosate resistant soybean was 
$307.5 million. The total share recouped by the U.S. was estimated at 94%, with U.S. 
producers capturing 20% of the total benefits. They explained the small share of the 
benefit compared to the total production of soybean by the fact that the cost savings as 
well as the yield increases were small. On the other side of the spectrum, gains for seed 
suppliers as well as innovator were estimated to be 68% of the total gains from the 
technology. 
Qaim and Traxler (2005) developed a model based on a three-region model (U.S., 
Argentina and Rest Of the World) with international spill-overs to measure welfare 
effects of the introduction of Glyphosate resistant soybean. The model was based on 
linear supply and demand curves as well as a parallel supply shift due to the new 
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technology. The main contributions of this study are that it is a more intensive study of 
Argentina’s supply shift and also that it considers the period 1996-2001 instead of only 
one year like most of the studies previously mentioned. They showed that consumers, 
producers, as well as private firms, benefited from the Glyphosate resistant soybean 
technology. Important differences could be noticed regarding the welfare gain 
distribution related to the adoption of the technology between the U.S. and Argentina. 
While in the U.S., a large part of the gain was captured by the innovating firms, in 
Argentina farmers were the main beneficiaries due to the larger adoption rate as well as 
weaker IP regulations. Technology spillovers from the U.S. brought an estimated welfare 
gain of U.S. $300 million to Argentina in 2001. At the other end of the spectrum, farmers 
in countries that have not adopted the technology faced a welfare loss because they faced 
lower prices without being able to benefit from the technological improvement. However, 
if, as some have speculated, some consumers are willing to pay a premium for non-GM 
foods, the European labeling rule implementation may allow producers of those non-
adopting countries to recoup some of their welfare loss. The authors concluded by 
explaining that developing countries can be the main beneficiaries from adopting GM 
technologies. However, the IP issue needs to be dealt with very carefully, as on one hand 
strong IP laws can reduce social welfare, while on the other hand laws that are too 
relaxed will not give an incentive to the private sector to develop the technology for the 
demanding country.  
Sobolevsky et al. (2005) used the Moschini et al. (2000) model as a starting point 
for their study. They modified it by introducing two important concepts. First, they made 
the assumption that GM soybean was a weakly inferior substitute for GM free soybean in 
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Europe. And second, they introduced the concept that because of the agricultural policy 
in the U.S., producers made production decisions based not on soybean prices alone, but 
on the larger of the soybean loan rate and soybean price. Most of the assumptions 
necessary to calibrate the model were similar to the ones made by Moschini et al. The 
differentiated demand system was calibrated by assuming that 50% of the population in 
Europe was sensitive to GM/GM free characteristic of soybean and that the total demand 
would rise by 5% if the two products were to be priced at the same price. They found 
that, if there was no U.S. price support, the U.S. producers would be worse off in all 
cases except in the case where there was no segregation cost.2 In the (real) situation 
where there was a price support, U.S. producer gain was $429 million, while the welfare 
effects on Brazilian producers range from a loss of $51 million to a gain of  $15  million, 
depending on the cost of segregation. The effects for Argentinean producers ranged from 
a loss of $27 million to a gain of $9 million. The most beneficial outcomes were in the 
case of no segregation cost. Overall world welfare, according to their study, would have 
risen between $1,538 million and $1,668 million depending on the level of segregation 
cost chosen. 
The previous studies have shown that calculating the effect of the introduction of 
a new technology on welfare is a complex task. The proprietary aspect of the 
biotechnology applied to agriculture has an effect on the welfare distribution. Besides the 
market power potential given to the innovator due to the acquisition of a patent, the 
welfare distribution is also very sensitive to the assumptions made concerning the supply 
shift. A study conducted by Moschini and Lapan in 1997 directly related to Glyphosate 
                                                 
2 Cost associated with keeping non-GM soybean from any contamination from GM soybean  
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resistant soybean estimated that producers earn 42% to 76% of the welfare gain in 1997, 
but another one in 2003 by Price et al. calculated the gains as being only 20% for 
producers.  
Literature Discussion 
 
This literature review has emphasized how important GM organisms are in the 
consumer’s mind. Numerous studies have looked at consumer behavior toward GM food. 
Some of them elaborated on market mechanisms that could be potentially welfare 
enhancing such as mandatory versus voluntarily labeling of GM food. European 
consumers appear to be the most resistant to the new technology according to most of the 
studies.  
Producers’ attitudes towards GM crops have been to widely accept them in the 
U.S., with herbicide resistant soybean occupying 90% of U.S. soybean acreage in 2005. 
Farmers’ attitudes were somewhat ambiguous at first because of the uncertainty that was 
attached to European consumers’ concerns about the new product. But, as soon as they 
saw the cost savings associated with the production of GM crops as well as the relatively 
good acceptance of domestic consumers, they widely adopted the technology.  
In order to calculate welfare gains appropriately, and especially in the case of 
Glyphosate resistant soybean, studies show the importance of taking into account the 
characteristics of the sectors involved. Because the GM technology innovator holds a 
patent, it is given some market power in order for it to recoup its investments in research. 
This is why, as explained by Moschini and Lapan, Price et al. and Falck-Zepeda et al., 
while the output market is still under perfect competition, the input market is not.  
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The 3 studies, previously mentioned, have a similar approach for calculating 
welfare gains due to the introduction of Glyphosate resistant soybean. They first try to 
estimate an average cost saving per acre and use it to calculate the supply shift. Once 
supply shift is combined with demand and supply elasticities provided by the literature, 
they can estimate the surplus that will go to producers and to consumers. Monopoly profit 
is then measured by estimating the royalty fee per acre collected by the innovator.  
There are several limitations in the previous studies from the way the model was 
constructed. First, those studies rely heavily on the assumptions made concerning market 
elasticities as well as the cost savings of the GM technology. Generally, cost saving was 
calculated using crop budgets, surveys or other specialists’ inputs on the dollars saved per 
acre for Glyphosate resistant soybean compared to regular soybean.  
Second, while numerous studies have shown concerns especially amongst 
European consumers toward GMOs, U.S. soybean export demand shift does not seem to 
have been accounted for while measuring welfare, except in the case of the Sobolevsky et 
al. study. This is somewhat disconcerting as during the last 10 years Europe has been an 
important if not the most important world importer of soybean.  
Third, while looking at transmission of technology, it is very important to 
consider how the IPR are going to be respected. Indeed, evidence exists that IPRs do not 
have the same significance in foreign countries. For example, according to Moschini et 
al. it is not possible in Argentina to legally prevent the farmers from using their harvested 
grain as seed from one year to another. This indeed gives a competitive advantage to 
Argentinean producers and lessens the profit of the innovating company.  
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Last but not least, because of the nature of the model used in the studies that have 
looked at welfare issues concerning the introduction of Glyphosate resistant soybean, 
only one year is considered. This is due to the fact that the models have to be calibrated 
but it is somewhat restrictive as the analysis is static. Even Qaim and Traxler’s study, 
which looks at several years, calibrates the model for each year using a model less 
flexible that the one used in this study. 
The model that will be presented below will attempt to address some of the issues 
not dealt with in the welfare literature concerning the introduction of Glyphosate resistant 
soybean. First and foremost, while most studies note that consumer acceptance of those 
products may not be 100%, few of them attempt to model an eventual shift in the demand 
due to consumers’ resistance to genetically engineered crops. This is very important, 
because it means that if there is such a shift, then without the adoption of GMOs, prices 
would have been higher not only because of a smaller supply, but also because of a 
stronger demand. When calculating the counterfactual price, the demand shift needs to be 
accounted for; otherwise the results are biased toward overestimating the overall welfare 
gain, especially from the producer standpoint.   
Second, the study will be performed over multiple years to see whether, and how, 
variations from one year to another affect the results. Calculations performed only on one 
year may potentially miss the market dynamics and this study will attempt to account for 
that by evaluating the period 1998-2005. 
Lastly, it is largely accepted that producers are one of the main beneficiaries from 
this technology as it improves their ability to minimize cost. However, assuming that the 
consumer responds negatively to it, demand will be reduced and prices will fall. Even 
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though the technology reduces farmers’ costs, it is conceivable they still suffer a welfare 
loss overall. Here, a key question is how large a demand reduction is necessary from, say, 
European consumers, to make U.S. producers potentially worse off by the adoption of 
this technology. The model in this study will be capable of addressing this question.  
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CHAPTER 3 - Conceptual Model 
 
Following Moschini’s and Lapan’s lead, the conceptual framework is based on 
the following assumptions. The U.S. is a large soybean exporting country, adopting a 
new technology, which faces competition in the export market mainly from Brazil and 
Argentina. As suggested by several studies, home consumers are not sensitive in general 
to the introduction of GM engineered foods. Foreign consumers such as Europeans or 
Japanese seem to be more reserved concerning GM engineered food than Americans. The 
innovator of the technology holds a patent on Glyphosate resistant soybean, which means 
that it is allowed, if desired, to act as a monopoly in order to recoup the investment in 
research that resulted in the discovery of the new product.  
Similar to Moschini et al. (2000), and using the same notation, we can represent 
soybean production as: yLYB ⋅=  where YB is total production, L is the acres of land 
allocated to soybean production and y denotes yield per acre. Soybean yield per acre 
depends on the seeds planted per acre (also known as seed density), x, and a set of other 
inputs represented by the vector z. The per-acre production function is defined as 
y=f(x,z), where w and r are respectively the price of seeds and the price vector of other 
inputs (z). The profit function per acre can be defined as: 
(1) { }wxzrxzfPwrP BxzB −⋅−= ),(max),,( ,π   , 
where π is the profit per acre and PB is the price of one metric ton of soybean. 
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Seed rate recommendations often are not related to other input decisions. Let δ 
denote the optimal seed density rate and assume that it is “irrespective of the use of other 
inputs” (Moschini et al. (2000) p. 36). Equation (1) then can be simplified to: 
(2) wrPwrP BB δππ −= ),(~),,( , 
where ( , ) max{ ( , ) }B BzP r P f z r zπ δ= − ⋅% . The result of the assumptions above is that the 
optimal yield does not depend on the seed price. By Hotelling’s Lemma, 
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Land allocation to soybean production is the result of the maximization of overall 
farm profits. It is the allocation of acreage based on net returns per acre that will allocate 
the land use between soybean production and other competing crops: 
(4) )(πLL = . 
This implies that the total supply of soybean is 
(5) ),()),(~( rPywrPLY BBB ⋅−= δπ . 
Similarly, the total demand for soybean seeds can be written 
(6) δδπ ⋅−= )),(~(),,( wrPLwrPx BB . 
As the seed density is assumed to be the same between the old and the new 
technology, the new technology is adopted only if it provides a larger profit per acre. 
Letting the subscript “1” denote the new technology, farmers will adopt only if 
(7) ),(~),(~1 rPrP BB ππ > . 
The monopolist will price the seed such that it maximizes its overall profit. 
Assuming that the innovator will market this new technology in N countries numbered 
from 1 to N, the monopolist’s (direct) profit function to be maximized can be written 
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where c is the constant per unit production cost of the seeds, and w1,i is the per unit sales 
price of the new technology seeds in country i. However, in selecting a profit-maximizing 
seed price, the monopolist needs to take into account two feedback effects on farmers’ 
profit levels. First, the seed price will influence the farmer’s gain from adopting the new 
technology. Thus, the monopolist will want to ensure it chooses a w1,i  so that the new 
technology increases profits. This implies the decision problem is subject to the 
constraint: 
(9) iiiBiiiiBi wrPwrP δπδπ −≥− ),(~),(~ ,,1,,1 . 
Second, the price chosen for seeds will affect the soybean supply by changing the 
land allocated to soybean production and/or by changing the yield per acre. Therefore 
soybean price is affected by the price charged by the monopoly for seed. We can write: 
)( 1,, wPP iBiB = where w1 is the vector of innovated input prices in each of the different 
producing countries. These feedback effects imply that the monopoly will have to solve 
the following problem to set the price of seeds: 
(10) [ ]⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −∑
=
N
i
iiiiBiw
cwwrwPx
1
,1,11, ),),((max
1
 
 s.t. iiiBiiiiBi wrwPwrwP δπδπ −≥− )),((~)),((~ 1,,11,,1  , i∀  
Temporarily dropping the country specification (i.e., not including the “i”), and 
assuming as previously mentioned that seed density is constant and equal to δ, the 
maximized profit per acre for the two technologies can be written as follows:  
(11) Standard technology:    wPGA B δηπ
η −++=
+1
1
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(12) Glyphosate resistant technology:  )1(
1
)1( 1 μδη
βαπ η +−+
+++= + wPGA B  
 
With: 
η = elasticity of yield with respect to soybean price 
A,G= parameters subsuming all other input prices (the vector r) 
β= coefficient of yield change due to the Glyphosate resistant technology. 
α= coefficient of unit profit increase due to the Glyphosate resistant technology 
 (e.g., from herbicide and herbicide applications cost savings). 
μ=markup on Glyphosate resistant seed price (reflecting technology fee) 
In this specification, the profit advantage of the new technology is affected in two 
ways, first by the parameter β which affects the yield, and through the parameter α 
directly. Applying Hotelling’s lemma, this specification leads to a constant elasticity 
output supply function of soybean. In particular, the yield functions (i.e., production per 
acre) are ηBGPy = for the standard technology and ηβ BGPy )1( +=  for the Glyphosate 
resistant technology. 
Producers face different production conditions and have different technology 
adoption strategies. When a new technology such as Glyphosate resistant soybean is 
introduced, the adoption is not instantaneous; some farmers will adopt it immediately 
while others will wait until the technology has proven its merit to their eyes. In this case 
we assume that the new technology in fact increases profits (i.e., 1 1( ) ( )w wπ δ π δ⋅ − > ⋅ −% % ), 
making adoption beneficial for all farmers. However, perhaps due to limited information 
about the gain in profits, some farmers do not adopt. At a given point in time, an 
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exogenously determined fraction ρ ∈  [0,1] of farmers have adopted the new technology.3 
The average profit per acre becomes: 
(13) )1(
1
)1( 1 ρμδη
ρβραπ η +−+
+++= + wPGA B , 
and the average yield is then ηρβ BGPy )1( +=  . The overall supply of soybean depends 
on yield as well as the acreage planted to soybean. 
Land supply for soybean production is based on average land rents, which are 
affected by output price as well as the adoption rate (see figure 9 in chapter 5 for a 
graphical representation). Assuming a constant elasticity form, land supply can be written 
(14) θπλ=L , 
where θ is the elasticity of land supply in response to the profitability of soybean 
production, and λ is a scale parameter. The aggregate supply is obtained by multiplying 
yield by the number of acres devoted to soybean production. Total production can be 
written as follows: 
(15) η
θ
η ρβρμδη
ρβραλ BBB GPwPGAY )1()1(1
)1( 1 +⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−+
+++= +  
The demand functions for the three different products made from soybean 
(soybean grain, soybean oil, soybean meal) will have to be estimated for each of the 
                                                 
3 There is a large literature examining the causes of delayed adoption of profitable technologies 
(e.g., Sunding and Zilberman, 2000; Dong  and Saha, 1998; McWilliams and Zilberman, 1996). The 
interest of the study here is not in explaining the rate of adoption, but rather on evaluating the market 
consequences of a given adoption rate. Thus I do not formally model the way ρ changes through time, 
although that is a possible extension of this work. 
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different regions of the study. Moschini et al. assume those demand curves do not shift in 
response to the introduction of Glyphosate resistant technology (i.e., GM food) in the 
market. Here, the possibility that the demand may have shifted in some regions is 
accounted for, reflecting, for instance, numerous polls in Europe showing that consumers 
are concerned about biotechnology modified foods.   
Soybean is traded under three different forms, soybean grain, soybean oil or 
soybean meal. If PO, PM and PB are respectively the prices for soybean oil, soybean meal 
and soybean grain, the associated demand functions can be written as DO(PO), DM(PM) 
and DB(PB).The demand functions, assuming a no-labeling scenario, for those products in 
constant elasticity form are specified as: 
(16) iBw iBiBiBiBiB PPD ,,,,,, )1()(
∈−−= ρϕκ  
(17) iOw iOiOiOiOiO PPD ,,,,,, )1()(
∈−−= ρϕκ  
(18) iMw iMiMiMiMiM PPD ,,,,,, )1()(
∈−−= ρϕκ  
where ij,∈ is the constant demand elasticity for product j in region i, ρw is the world 
adoption rate of the new technology, and φj,i is a measure of consumer sensitivity to 
genetically modified food. The terms in parentheses account for demand shifts due to 
Glyphosate resistant technology adoption. While ρw is also a supply shifting parameter, it 
is used here in the demand function as a proxy for the consumer’s perception of the 
likelihood they are consuming genetically modified soybean products.  
The index φj,i ∈  [-1,1] measures the consumer sensitivity in country i to 
consuming product j that contains genetically modified soybean. The κs are scalars 
subsuming all other demand shifters (price of substitutes, income, etc.). 
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As Moschini et al. state, (p. 41) “Suppose that crushing one unit of soybean 
produces γ0 units of oil and γm units of meal, and that a unit crushing costs in region i are 
constant and equal to mi (the so-called crushing margin). Then, for given regional supply 
quantities Yb,i of soybean, and given changes in stocks ΔSj,i for product j, in region i, the 
spatial market equilibrium conditions are written as:”  
(19) [ ] [ ]∑ ∑∑
= ==
Δ−=+
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ Δ+
RCEABUi RCEABUi
iBiBiBiB
RCEABUi
iOiOiO SYPDSPD
,,,,, ,,,,,
,,,,
,,,,,
,,,
0
)()(1γ  
The previous equality says the that total quantity of soybean produced minus the 
total change in stock has to be equal to total quantity of soybean demanded as grain plus 
total quantity of soybean grain demanded crushed into oil, plus the changes in oil stock 
(converted back to grain equivalent). This obviously assumes that there are no wastes of 
soybean between production and consumption. 
(20) [ ] [ ]
⎭⎬
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⎧ Δ+=
⎭⎬
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⎧ Δ+ ∑∑
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,,,,,
,,,
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,,,
0
)(1)(1 γγ  
The previous equality assures that the quantity of soybean oil and soybean meal 
demanded are linked by the technical coefficients γO and γM. Indeed when crushing 
soybean, about 20% by weight is transformed into oil and the remaining 80% is soybean 
meal. Therefore the demands of those products has to reflect this technicality, implying 
that prices of the three products obey the relationship  
(21) UMmUOOUUB PPmP ,,, γγ +=+ . 
The previous equality ensures that there is no incentive left for someone to crush some 
more soybean to make a profit. Prices of a given product in different regions must differ 
by transportation costs and tariffs. These conditions are: 
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BBUBBB tPP ,,, +=  
BMUMBM tPP ,,, +=  
BOUOBO tPP ,,, +=  
ABUBAB tPP ,,, +=  
AMUMAM tPP ,,, +=  
AOUOAO tPP ,,, +=  
EBUBEB tPP ,,, +=  
EMUMEM tPP ,,, +=  
EOUOEO tPP ,,, +=  
CBUBCB tPP ,,, +=  
CMUMCM tPP ,,, +=  
COUOCO tPP ,,, +=  
RBUBRB tPP ,,, +=  
RMUMRM tPP ,,, +=  
ROUORO tPP ,,, +=  
where tj,i is the price differential for product j in region i (relative to the United States) 
that reflect (constant) transportation costs (as well as possibly equivalent specific tariffs 
of existing commercial policies) and mU is the crushing margin in the U.S. The country 
indicators are defined as “U” representing the U.S., “B” for Brazil, “A”for Argentina,  
“E” for the European Union, “C” for China, and “R” for the Rest of the World. 
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CHAPTER 4 - Calibration 
 
The assumptions made during the calibration process of a partial equilibrium 
model are critical in interpreting the findings appropriately. Presented below are the 
different assumptions made as well as the calculations leading to the different supply and 
demand parameters. In this study, parameters are calibrated for each individual year 
based on year-specific data. This means that in the period 1998-2005, 8 supply functions 
and 24 demand functions were calibrated. This is unique to this study, as other welfare 
analyses of Glyphosate resistant soybean were based on a single year. 
 
Prices Calibration 
 
Soybean grain, soybean oil and soybean meal prices are important components of 
the calibration for the model. The historical data series of prices were obtained from the 
USDA and are reported in table 1. They were converted to dollars per metric tons to be 
consistent with the quantity data.  
The United States has a price support system such that producers do not face 
world price if it is below the loan rate. The Loan Deficiency Payments (LDP) program set 
a minimum price below which the U.S. government will provide the difference to 
farmers. This distorts the market because when making production decisions, farmers 
receive the maximum of the world price and the loan rate. Consumers, however, pay the 
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world price, so that there may be a discrepancy in the U.S. between the prices received by 
producers and the prices paid by consumers. The calibration of the model accounts for 
these policy features by setting the price faced by producers as the maximum of world 
price and loan rate.  
Soybean Prices and Loan Rate in the U.S.
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Figure 3: Soybean price versus soybean loan rate in the U.S.   
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Table 1: Soybean prices in the U.S. 
  Year       Price Price 
beginning 48% protein, 
48% 
protein, 
October 1 Decatur Decatur 
  (solvent) (solvent) 
 $/ton $/MT 
   
1995 235.92 $260.06 
1996 270.90 $298.62 
1997 185.28 $204.24 
1998 138.55 $152.73 
1999 167.70 $184.86 
2000 173.60 $191.36 
2001 167.70 $184.86 
2002 181.60 $200.18 
2003 256.05 $282.25 
2004 182.90 $201.61 
2005 172.50 $190.15 
1/ Includes millfeed (hull meal).  2/  Forecast. 
Sources:  Agricultural Marketing Service, USDA and 
Bureau of the Census. 
 
  Year       Price Price 
beginning Crude, Crude, 
October 1 Decatur Decatur 
 Cents/lb. $/MT 
   
1995 24.70 $544.54 
1996 22.51 $496.26 
1997 25.83 $569.45 
1998 19.80 $436.52 
1999 15.59 $343.70 
2000 14.15 $311.95 
2001 16.46 $362.88 
2002 22.04 $485.90 
2003 29.97 $660.73 
2004 23.01 $507.28 
2005 22.00 $485.10 
1/ Forecast. 
Sources: Agricultural Marketing Service, USDA and 
Bureau of the Census. 
 
  Year Price Price 
beginning Average Average 
September 1 received received 
  by farmers by farmers 
 $/bu. $/MT 
   
1995 6.72 $246.92 
1996 7.35 $270.07 
1997 6.47 $237.73 
1998 4.93 $181.15 
1999 4.63 $170.12 
2000 4.54 $166.82 
2001 4.38 $160.94 
2002 5.53 $203.19 
2003 7.34 $269.70 
2004 5.74 $210.91 
2005 5.70 $209.44 
1/ Total supply includes imports.  2/ Forecast. 
Sources:  National Agricultural Statistics Service, USDA 
and Bureau of the Census. 
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Figure 3 depicts the variations in soybean prices and loan rate over time. It shows 
that, from 1998 through 2001, the government had to compensate the difference in prices 
between the U.S. price and the loan rate to producers, while consumers enjoyed low 
market prices. While computing LDPs based on the average annual prices is appropriate 
in the context of this model, it should be noted that it may introduce bias. For example, 
these calculations assume that LDPs were granted on all production in 1998, but it might 
not have been the case because of intra-year price fluctuations as well as producers’ 
marketing arrangements. 
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Figure 4: Soybean producer prices ($/MT) over time 
 
The tj,i’s are set based on the values used by Moschini et al. (2000). Because of 
the phenomenon of arbitrage, it is indeed expected that all prices should be equal once 
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transportation costs and tariffs4 are accounted for. Transportation costs are assumed to 
remain constant over the study period at the levels presented in table 2.  
 
Table 2: Price differential between countries in $/MT 
 U.S.  E.U.  ROW China Argentina Brazil 
Soybean 
grain  $       -    $       30  $       30   $       30  $     (10)  $     (10) 
Soybean oil  $       -    $       60  $       60   $       60  $     (10)  $     (10) 
Soybean 
meal  $       -    $       30  $       30   $       30  $     (10)  $     (10) 
 
 
Demand System 
 
Each year, demand equations are calibrated such that, based on price, estimated 
demand would be equal to observed quantity consumed. This can be formulated as 
follows. Recall from the previous chapter that the demand for soybean, equation (16), is 
modeled as iBw iBiBiBiBiB PPD ,,,,,, )1()(
∈−−= ρϕκ . Given values of the parameters ϕ, ρ, and 
Є, along with an observed price, PB,i, and quantity, DB,i(PB,i)obs, the unknown scalar κ can 
be computed as:  
obsiBiBiBiBiB PDP iBw )(.)1( ,,,,, ,
∈−−= ρϕκ  
 
 
                                                 
4 A higher price differential for soybean oil for some countries reflects higher imports duties. This 
is very common for many countries importing vegetable oil (Meilke et al., 2001) 
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Assuming initially that φ=0, the previous equation simplifies to 
obsiBiBiBiB PDP iB )(. ,,,, ,
∈=κ . 
In this version of the model, demand does not shift due to consumers’ wariness 
about GM products. Later this assumption will be relaxed and the value of φ for Europe 
making the U.S. worse off will be estimated. 
Similarly, we get respectively for oil (17) and soybean meal (18): 
obsiOiOiOiO PDP iO )(. ,,,, ,
∈=κ  
obsiMiMiMiM PDP iM )(. ,,,, ,
∈=κ  
Demand elasticities are defined as being equal to 0.4 as assumed by Moschni et al. 
(2000), an assumption based on the findings of various other studies these authors cite. 
Therefore, ЄB,i = ЄO,i = ЄM,i = 0.4 . 
 
Supply Curve 
 
In order to calibrate the supply curve for each country, numerous data are needed. 
Information such as yield per country, acreage harvested by country, the profitability 
difference between Glyphosate resistant soybean and regular soybean, as well as the seed 
price markup for the Glyphosate resistant seeds, is necessary. 
Production data, such as yield, acres harvested and total production of soybean 
grains are provided by the USDA. Other production data, such as seed cost or herbicide 
cost, are provided by the Kansas State University Extension service. The profitability 
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difference between Glyphosate resistant soybean and regular soybean, Δπ, can be derived 
from subtracting equation (11) from equation (12): 1
1 B
G P wηβπ α δ μη
+Δ = + −+  
Assuming that the technology is not yield improving (i.e., setting β=0), the 
profitability advantage reduces to the cost saving on herbicide, α, minus the extra cost of 
more expensive seeds, δwμ. The estimates of these components are described in turn 
below. 
Figure 5 shows the cost for herbicide associated with growing Glyphosate 
resistant soybean versus regular soybean. These costs were calculated based on Kansas 
State University Extension weed scientist recommendations (Peterson, 2006). For regular 
soybean, the recommendation was the pre-emergent application of a mixture of Boundary 
(1.5 pt/acre) (Squadron before 2000). The post-emergent herbicide recommended is 
Firstrate (0.3oz/acre) and Flexstar (0.75 pt/acre). For the Glyphosate resistant soybean, a 
sole application of Glyphosate was recommended at 1.5 pt per acre once a season. 
Acknowledging the fact that some farmers may spray Glyphosate on their crops twice a 
year, I multiplied the cost associated with this process by 1.5 to capture some of this 
double application. The Glyphosate cost was computed by assuming, consistent with 
most farmers’ actions, that the cheapest available Glyphosate product will be applied, 
even if it is a generic brand. 
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Table 3: Regular soybean, herbicide recommendations  
Year PRE rate  unit  
Chem. 
cost 
unit 
cost POST rate unit 
chem 
cost 
unit 
cost POST rate  unit 
Chem. 
cost 
unit 
cost 
2006 Boundary 1.5 pt $70  
6.5 
lb/gal Firstrate 0.3 oz $28 oz Flexstar 0.75 pt $110 gal 
2005 Boundary 1.5 pt $67  
6.5 
lb/gal Firstrate 0.3 oz $27 oz Flexstar 0.75 pt $91 gal 
2004 Boundary 1.3 pt $82  
8 
lb/gal Firstrate 0.3 oz $27 oz Flexstar 1 pt $90 gal 
2003 Boundary 1.3 pt $72  
8 
lb/gal Firstrate 0.3 oz $27 oz Flexstar 1 pt $90 gal 
2002 Boundary 1.3 pt $76  
8 
lb/gal Firstrate 0.3 oz $25 oz Flexstar 1 pt $95 gal 
2001 Boundary 1.3 pt $75  
8 
lb/gal Firstrate 0.3 oz $26 oz Flexstar 1 pt $93 gal 
2000 Boundary 1.3 pt $82  
8 
lb/gal Firstrate 0.3 oz $25 oz Flexstar 1 pt $93 gal 
1999 squadron 3 pt $42  
2.33 
lb/gal Firstrate 0.3 oz $24 oz Flexstar 1 pt $92 gal 
1998 squadron 3 pt $62  
2.33 
lb/gal Firstrate 0.3 oz $22 oz Flexstar 1 pt $54 gal 
 
Table 4: Glyphosate resistant soybean, herbicide recommendations  
RR rate  unit  chemical cost unit cost 
glyphosate 1.5 pt $15 gal 
glyphosate 1.5 pt $18 gal 
glyphosate 1.5 pt $29 gal 
glyphosate 1.5 pt $39 gal 
glyphosate 1.5 pt $39 gal 
glyphosate 1.5 pt $39 gal 
glyphosate 1.5 pt $39 gal 
glyphosate 1.5 pt $45 gal 
glyphosate 1.5 pt $54 gal 
glyphosate 1.5 pt $54 gal 
glyphosate 1.5 pt $49 gal 
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Figure 5: Soybean herbicide (chemical and application) cost in dollars per acre (Source: 
KSU: SRP958). 
 
Application costs were gathered from the Kansas Statistical Agriculture Service 
and are shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Custom rate of herbicide application in dollar per acre (Kansas Agricultural 
Statistical Service) 
 
Kansas State University Extension budgets have tracked the seed cost for 
herbicide resistant soybean as well as regular soybean (figure 7). Assuming 150,000 
plants per acre, which means planting 50 lbs. of seed per acre, δw was computed for 
every year. Moschini et al. argue that intellectual property rights on seeds are less likely 
to be enforced and that, in general, seeds are cheaper in countries outside the United 
States. Therefore δw was set at 88.9% (Moschini et al.) of the U.S. value for all other 
countries. 
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Figure 7: Soybean seed cost in dollars per pound (Source KSU) 
 
Data presented in figure 7 were used to calculate the percentage markup on the 
Glyphosate resistant seeds (the parameter μ, defined in equation (12)) by stating that 
GM Seed Cost Regular Seed Cost
Regular Seed Cost
μ −= . This markup was calculated for each specific 
year and represents the extra percentage charge on seeds because of their Glyphosate 
resistant characteristic. Figure 8 shows that the markup followed an upward trend, and 
that lately it has been varying between 50 and 55%. Figure 7 shows that, while seed 
prices were fairly flat up to 2003, they increased significantly since then. It also appears 
that Glyphosate resistant seed prices are increasing at a slightly faster rate than regular 
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seed prices. Part of this difference may be due to the increase in the “tech fee” charged by 
the monopoly to compensate for the loss of patent on Roundup.5 
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Figure 8: Evolution of seed premium markup (μ) over time in the U.S. 
 
Because IPR protection is a lot weaker in the rest of the world, it is difficult for 
the monopoly to prevent farmers in these countries from using some of their harvested 
beans as seed the following year. In the U.S., this practice is prohibited by a contract 
between Monsanto and the seed buyer, but no such contract can be applied in Argentina, 
for instance, where a farmer’s right to use harvested grain as seed is protected by law 
                                                 
5 As noted above, Roundup is the product name under which Monsanto sells Glyphosate. After 
Monsanto’s patent on Roundup expired in 2000, producers have the choice of purchasing generic 
Glyphosate. 
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(Qaim and Traxler 2005). Therefore the markup rate is set to one-half the U.S. value for 
South American countries and to one-fourth of the U.S. value for all other countries 
(ROW). 
The difference in profit due to the adoption of the technology (Δπ) is a very 
important variable as it is used to compute several of the profit function coefficients. Δπ 
is calculated by computing the difference in herbicide and seed costs between the 
Glyphosate resistant technology and the conventional technology. As noted above, this 
implicitly assumes that there is neither a yield reduction nor a yield improvement due to 
the technology adoption (i.e. β=0). Similarly, yield is assumed to be unaffected by the 
weed control techniques considered, so that profit is affected only by the difference in the 
combined herbicide and seed cost. 
The scale parameter, λ, can be calibrated by simply dividing the observed 
harvested area by πθ :  
(22) obsL θλ π= .  
The parameter G can be calculated using the following formula:  
(23) ηβρ B
obs
P
yG
)..1( +=  
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The formula to calibrate the value of A is as follows:  
(24) )1(
1
)1( 1 μδη
βαπ η +−+
+++= + wpGA B  where π (at the calibrating stage) is 
assumed to be 40% of the gross income.6  
The parameter θ can be rewritten as follows:  
(25) 
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Where ψ is the elasticity of soybean acreage with respect to soybean price.  Moschini et 
al. make the argument that price-based land supply elasticities in the literature may 
underestimate the ability of producers to change from one crop to another. Following 
their recommendation, we assume that ψ takes the value 0.8 in the U.S., 1.0 in South 
America, and 0.6 for the rest of the world. This translates to a computed value of θ of 
0.32, 0.4, and 0.24 for the three regions, respectively.7 Because it is broadly accepted that 
the response of yield to changes in prices is limited, we set η to be equal to 0.05, 
identically to what was done by Moschini et al.  
Finally, the observed prices, quantities, and changes in stocks are inserted in 
equations (19), (20), and (21), which are then solved for the remaining unknown 
                                                 
6 To calibrate parameter A, it is necessary to have an estimate of profit. Like Moschni et al. we 
chose to use 40% of gross income per ha to represent profit. This parameter is essentially a scaling 
constant. 
7 At the calibrating stage, BPy.4. ×=π , which results in ψθ ×= 4. after simplification 
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parameters: the technical coefficients γO, γM and the crushing margin mU. Once all the 
parameters are estimated, the quantities produced are equal to quantities demanded plus 
or minus changes in stock, production matches observed production, estimated yield 
matches observed yield, estimated acreage harvested matches observed acreage, and the 
arbitrage has played its role and there are no profit opportunities left to crush soybean 
grain in soybean meal and oil. 
Although not part of the calibration process per se, another parameter needed in 
the model is the adoption rate of Glyphosate resistant soybean, ρ. Table 5 summarizes the 
observed adoption rate by year. These data were compiled from different sources: USDA, 
ISAAA, and Qaim & Traxler. 
 
Table 5: Glyphosate resistant soybean planted as a percentage of total soybean acreage 
by country. 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
U.S. 0 8 17 45 55 54 68 75 81 85 87 
Brazil 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 29 
Argentina 0 6 25 59 77 90 98 100 100 100 100 
 
Table 6 presents the value of the key parameters that do not change from one year 
to another for all the different countries considered. 
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Table 6: Base values of key parameters 
 U.S. E.U. China ROW Argentina Brazil 
Price differential for beans (tB) 0 30 30 30 -10 -10 
Price differential for oil (tO) 0 60 60 60 -10 -10 
Price differential for meal (tM) 0 30 30 30 -10 -10 
RR yield change coefficient (β) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Price elasticity of yield (η) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Supply (area) elasticity (ψ) 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 1 1 
Land supply elasticity (θ) 0.32 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.4 0.4 
Bean demand elasticity (-ЄB) -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 
Oil demand elasticity (-ЄO) -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 
Meal demand elasticity (-ЄM) -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 
 
The calibration steps described above will create a model that reproduces the 
consumption, production, and changes in soybean stocks observed from year to year, 
where farmers adopt the technology at the observed rate. The relevant counterfactual 
comparison is a situation where Glyphosate resistant soybean were not adopted. Very 
likely, changes in stock would have been different in that situation, but because it is 
counterfactual there are no data on the changes in stocks that would have occurred. 
Because the goal of this study is not to model changes in stock, but to measure the 
welfare implications of technology adoption, the calibrated model must be modified so 
that changes in stock are equal to zero in both cases. This modification accords with 
previous studies (e.g., Moschini et al.) and makes the interpretation of computed welfare 
effects more straightforward. Additionally, it allows for consistent comparisons across 
model years.  
To develop the desired model, two additional stages of calibration are required, 
making calibration a three-step process overall. The first step is to determine the 
parameters based on observed data and observed changes in stock, as described above.  
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Once those parameters are calculated, the adoption rate for each country as well as the 
changes in stock are set to zero and prices for beans, meal and oil are calculated so that 
the markets clear and all conditions are satisfied. That is the second step. The third step 
calculates the different prices using the adoption rates used during step #1 but this time 
assuming that changes in stock are equal to zero.  
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CHAPTER 5 - Results 
Welfare measures once supply and demand functions are known are usually fairly 
straightforward. The following section will present the empirical findings resulting from 
the calibration process shown previously, but first the results calculations will be 
explicated. Finally, the effect of GMO on Europe’s demand will be assessed from two 
different angles. The first perspective will look at how much demand would need to shift 
to make the U.S. as a whole worse off. The second approach will assume that the 
structure of European demand did not change, except for the impact of GMO introduction 
on consumer preferences. The resulting value of φ (index of consumers’ sensitivity to 
GMO) is calculated so that the model demand functions match observed consumption 
data. 
Welfare Measures of Interest 
 
The welfare changes are calculated from the calibrated supply and demand 
curves. First, let us represent the observed price for product j in region i by ijP ,  and let 
ijP ,ˆ be the price that would be observed if the Glyphosate resistant technology had not 
been introduced. The change in consumer surplus is then: 
(27) ∫∫
∞∞
−=Δ
ijij P
ij
P
wijij dvvDdvvDCS
,,
ˆ
,,, ),0(),(ρ . 
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Similarly )( iiL π is the optimal allocation of land to grow soybean in country i 
based on soybean profit per acre in country i. Using parallel notation as for consumer 
surplus, the change in producer surplus can be written 
(28) ∫=Δ i
i
dvvLPS ii
π
πˆ
)(  
This is depicted in figure 9, which illustrates the fact that soybean compete with 
corn in the acreage allocation process. As more soybean are planted, less acres are 
planted into corn.  
The allocation process is resolved when the profit of the last acre planted to 
soybean is equally as profitable as the last acre planted to corn. Increasing the 
profitability of soybean from πˆ  to π  will shift some acres from corn to soybean 
production, as reflected by the dashed lines on either side of area e. The underlying 
assumption of such a graph is that the land supply function for soybean does not shift 
over time. This can be a strong assumption, especially in the coming years with the 
pressure to grow corn to supply ethanol plants. Therefore, if there is a bias in these 
calculations, it is very likely to be on the side of overestimating the real producer gains.  
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Figure 9: Graphical representation of producers’ welfare gains calculation 
 
In order to measure producers’ net gain due to the introduction of Glyphosate 
resistant soybean, the loss from the corn side of the market needs to be considered. 
However, the losses in the corn market are already included in the expression for ΔPS in 
equation (28). To verify this, table 3 shows the welfare calculation based on the areas in 
figure 9, delineating the welfare effects for corn and soybean. As shown in the table, the 
net effect on producers, taking losses in the corn market into account, is area a. This is the 
same area traced out by the integral in equation (28). 
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Table 7: Producers’ welfare gains calculation 
 Profit Before 
Innovation 
Profit After 
Innovation 
Change in profit 
Soybean  b+c a+b+c+d+e a+d+e 
Corn d+e+f+g+h f+g+h -d-e 
Total Profit b+c+d+e+f+g+h a+b+c+d+e+ f+g+h a 
 
The last welfare measure of interest is the monopolist’s profit. The monopolist’s 
profit in each country i is calculated by determining how many acres are planted to the 
new technology ( i iLρ ) and multiplying it by the seeding rate and the markup. The total 
profit is to the innovator is then given by 
(29) ∑
=
=Π
RSUi
iiii
M wL
,,
δμρ  
Note that in this study, the innovator’s profit is mainly determined by exogenous 
variables. The only variable that is endogenously calculated is the total acreage planted 
into soybean. Price of seeds is taken as a given and it is not calculated by explicitly 
solving the innovator’s profit maximization problem in equation (10). Assessing the 
optimality of the observed prices is a possible extension of this work. 
Empirical Findings, No Demand Shift 
 
The period of analysis is 1998-2005, corresponding to the years when all relevant 
data were available. Table 8 reports the change in Producer and Consumer Surplus from 
the introduction of the Glyphosate resistant technology, as well as the cost to the U.S. 
government through the LDP program and the gains to the monopolist selling the new 
technology.  
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Table 8: Change in welfare, monopoly profit and government cost, from glyphosate 
resistant soybean, by country and market sector, 1998-2005 ($ million) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
US PS 480.73        652.21        567.86        726.00        488.69        414.21        592.02        451.54        
EU PS (7.01)           (7.61)           (6.51)           (8.49)           (4.49)           (3.12)           (4.57)           (5.23)           
China PS (68.88)         (88.87)         (84.36)         (99.99)         (83.44)         (75.90)         (101.22)       (104.26)       
ROW PS (79.39)         (105.67)       (93.42)         (105.14)       (86.55)         (98.43)         (120.74)       (132.95)       
Argentina PS 94.19          139.25        192.03        218.94        316.29        271.08        387.46        332.70        
Brazil PS (144.70)       (218.10)       (220.76)      (287.70)     (268.48)     (242.84)     (265.84)       (88.42)        
US CS 189.12        249.55        231.42        280.32        221.27        196.12        282.53        281.19        
EU CS 119.44        181.05        182.63        225.28        173.45        153.57        198.64        204.24        
China CS 104.56        146.92        147.96        182.59        194.47        186.11        264.44        300.15        
ROW CS 241.38        317.63        308.27        391.08        318.08        287.38        398.91        417.88        
Argentina CS 6.41            9.06            9.22            13.05          11.89          12.38          15.51          17.24          
Brazil CS 57.83          79.51          71.48         89.59        76.33        70.70        98.70          100.16       
Monopoly 112.60        133.47        160.62       175.90      183.90      250.57      301.25        387.01       
US Gov (341.86)       (492.57)       (446.34)      (576.29)     -            -            -              -              
 
Consumers (assuming here that no consumers have changed their consumption 
habits due to the introduction of GMO) gained worldwide from the introduction of the 
new technology. The monopoly gain increased steadily as the adoption rate rose 
worldwide. Because of the LDP program, the U.S. government encountered large losses 
at first, over $576 million in 2001, but as soon as the loan rate was dropped to a lower 
level, the adoption of the technology appears to be cost free from the U.S. government 
perspective. The results for producers are mixed. Producers in the countries where the 
technology was adopted early, such as Argentina and the U.S., have large producer gains 
(for U.S. producers, the smallest gain was 9% in 2003 and the largest was 19% in 2001). 
Producers in other countries, such as Brazil, where the technology was adopted later, or 
Europe, where it was never adopted, were affected negatively by the innovation.  As 
discussed in more detail below, the experience of Brazil illustrates the difficulty in 
overcoming late adoption and that significant gains will be foregone by doing so. 
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Figure 10 shows the uneven distribution of producer gains among the different 
players in the soybean industry. As noted above, only the U.S. and Argentina, the early 
adopters, obtained positive producer gains. Interestingly, immediately after the U.S. LDP 
program became less generous to U.S. producers in 2001, Argentinean producers saw an 
increase in welfare from the new technology. Meanwhile, U.S. producers suffered an 
even larger reduction in their gains, which decreased by $238 million from 2001 to 2002, 
despite an increase in U.S. acreage converted to Glyphosate resistant soybean at the time.  
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Figure 10: Producer surplus gains ($ million) due to glyphosate resistant soybean 
adoption 
Of course, the largest beneficiaries of the policy change were U.S. taxpayers, who 
saw a $600 million reduction in government expenses from 2001-2002. Before that 
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period, when prices were below the loan rate, government expenditures on the LDP 
program grew quite steadily from their 1998 level of about $230 million. This can be 
understood as a consequence of the new technology. The technology shifted supply to the 
right, which, ceteris paribus, meant that more was produced for the same price.  
Government expenditures on the LDP program grew in direct proportion to the increased 
production. In the 1998-2001 period, all but $150 million of the producer welfare gain 
came from the LDP program. 
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Figure 11: Consumer surplus gains over time ($ million), assuming no demand shift due 
to GM food products. 
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Figure 11 shows that consumers worldwide gained from the technology adoption 
(again, under the assumption of no demand shift). While all gains were positive, they 
were uneven over time. Overall, they followed an upward path toward a maximum in 
2005 of over $1.3 billion, mirroring the steadily increasing rate of technology adoption. 
However, the gains departed from this path in the years following 2001 when the U.S. 
LDP payments ceased.  This can be explained by the fact that consumer gains were 
artificially inflated while the LDP was depressing world prices by giving U.S. farmers an 
incentive to overproduce. In these early years, consumer gains were disproportionately 
large compared to the technology adoption rate. Once the loan rate in the U.S. was 
readjusted, consumers’ gains fell as they started facing higher prices because prices were 
above the loan rate and U.S. production was commensurate with market signals. 
Figure 12 shows the total gains by country. For most countries, it is the sum of 
consumer and producer surplus, but for the U.S. it also includes the monopoly gains as 
well as the LDP cost to the government. 
The overall gains from the technology are largest in the U.S., where they grew 
from slightly over $400 million in 1998 to almost $1.2 billion in 2004. Figure 12 also 
shows the effects of LDP on the overall gains in the U.S. - in 2002 when the loan rate 
was decreased, so was the cost to the government. Another changing factor between 2001 
and 2002 was an increase in world prices (Figure 3). This obviously improved the gains 
to U.S. producers, but also the gains of producers in the other adopting country - 
Argentina. Later, as more Brazilian producers adopted the technology, the gains received 
by Argentina and the U.S. began to decrease slightly (i.e., from 2004 to 2005).  
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Countries with low production that are mainly soybean consumers appear to 
receive a small welfare gain from the Glyphosate resistant technology. For the final 
years, gains increased to around $200 million for the European Union, and to about the 
same level for China.  
Brazil, which is mainly a producing country and a major player in the world 
soybean market, presents an interesting dynamic. Unlike Argentina, it was very slow to 
adopt the technology, as Brazilian producers were prohibited from using it up to 2002.  
While several studies mentioned that a share of the Brazilian production was already 
produced with Glyphosate resistant soybean before 2003, no reliable data were found to 
be used in the calculations.  More accurate data would have affected the gains faced by 
Brazilian producers.  Nevertheless, Brazil’s adoption delay had significant impacts on the 
overall gains from the technology. The model results indicate that, until 2005, Brazil did 
not show a positive gain, as it faced lower prices than it would have had without the 
technology while not enjoying the cost savings provided by it. The positive gain in 2005 
was made at the expense of the 2 other large soybean producers, the U.S. and Argentina.  
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Gains by country
-$400
-$200
$0
$200
$400
$600
$800
$1,000
$1,200
$1,400
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
M
ill
io
ns
Year
US EU China ROW Argentina Brazil  
Figure 12: Welfare gains by country including monopoly gains and government cost 
 
As the adoption process is continuing, especially in Brazil, the share of the gains 
captured by the U.S. producers is going to decrease (figure 10, 12 & 13). As more acres 
are grown using this technology, the more the supply curve shifts to the right and the 
lower the price faced by producers. U.S. producers, having adopted the technology on 
most of the available acreage, will see their gains start to erode as the adoption process in 
Brazil plays out. The monopoly, on the other hand, while not capturing the full markup 
from the adoption in South America, is still capturing more and more of the gains due to 
the increase Glyphosate resistant soybean acreage planted, as well as from the increase in 
the technology fee charged to producers.  
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Consumers in the U.S. benefited from the technology throughout the study period, 
although the size of their gains over time fluctuated depending on the market distortions 
introduced by the LDP program. By providing a minimum price for producers, the LDP 
program generated a non optimal level of planted acres, which combined with an increase 
of profitability per acre, resulted in lower prices faced by the consumers. A share of that 
lower price can be attributed to the Glyphosate resistant technology and therefore shows 
in the graph below.  
 
Welfare changes in the United States
$(800)
$(600)
$(400)
$(200)
$-
$200
$400
$600
$800
$1,000
$1,200
$1,400
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
M
ill
io
ns
Year
Monopoly
U.S.Consumer
s
U.S. Producers
Government
 
Figure 13: Welfare change ($ million) in the U.S. by sectors 
 
Figure 13 clearly shows that, while producers in the U.S. captured the largest 
share of national gains in the early years, probably due to the rapid rate of adoption 
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during that time, the distribution of the gains has changed over time. In 2005, the gains 
are distributed in nearly 3 equal parts among the different players. For 2005, U.S. 
producers are still the main beneficiaries from the situation, but the monopoly is close 
behind, while U.S. consumers capture the smallest share of gains from the technology. 
Future years should generate even larger monopoly gains because of the adoption in 
Brazil and the proprietary fees funneling back to the U.S. This increased adoption in 
Brazil should translate to lower prices that will benefit U.S. consumers but reduce the 
gains to U.S. producers. 
 
Consequences of a Demand Shift in Europe 
 
All of the results reported above assume that the demand for soybean is not 
sensitive to the introduction of Glypthosate resistant soybean, ceteris paribus. This 
assumption is now relaxed. In particular, this section reports the results from a version of 
the model where the demand in Europe is reduced as more acres worldwide are planted to 
Glyphosate resistant soybean. Sobolevsky et al. found that, if it were not for the 
government payments (LDP), a demand shift in Europe would leave U.S. producers 
worse off than without the technology (unless one assumes no segregation cost to 
separate Glyphosate resistant soybean from regular soybean). With the presence of the 
LDP and the fact that Glyphosate resistant soybean is providing a significant production 
cost saving, there is no reason to believe that U.S. producers could be made worse off by 
such a technology. On the other hand, the U.S. as a whole could be made worse off if 
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European consumers show some resistance concerning the purchase of products that have 
been genetically enhanced.  
Following that logic, I estimated the size of the demand shift needed in Europe to 
completely eliminate the gains in the U.S. from the new technology. In this version of the 
model, the demand in Europe is multiplied by the scaling factor s= wij
ρϕ )1( ,− where j 
represents soybean grain, soybean meal, or soybean oil, and i represents the country 
considered. For simplicity, we assume that the index representing the consumers’ 
sensitivity toward GM products, ϕ,  is the same among all three products (soybean grain, 
soybean oil, and soybean meal). Therefore 1-s represents the proportional reduction in 
demand. Table 5 reports the value of 1-s for Europe such that the U.S. gains from the 
technology equal zero. 
 
Table 9: European demand reduction necessary to reduce the U.S. gains from the 
technology to zero8. 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
European Demand 
Drop 
35.9% 42.7% 41.3% 48.4% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
The results in Table 5 are interesting in various respects. First, it shows that even 
in the worst year, it still requires at least a 36% drop in demand in Europe before the U.S. 
as a whole does not benefit from the technology. Second it shows that, after 2001, even if 
                                                 
8 N/A in years 2002-2005 stands for the fact that the U.S. gains on that period cannot be 
eliminated even with a 100% demand reduction in Europe. 
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Europe were to forgo the use of soybean products completely, it still would not make the 
U.S. as a whole worse off than a situation without Glyphosate resistant soybean. 
These results reflect the consequences of different factors affecting the soybean 
market. First and foremost, the years where the U.S. gains could have been eliminated 
correspond to the period where the LDP program was active. One interpretation of this 
result is that the program prevented the U.S. from capturing all the potential welfare gains 
from the technology. Second, the increase in volume of a major customer (China), whose 
consumers are considered insensitive to technology adoption, may have significantly 
affected the welfare gain distribution. The growing Chinese market provided a new outlet 
for soybean products even if European consumers were to avoid them. 
Table 5 shows that European consumers would need to be very sensitive to GM 
products to eliminate the U.S. gains, and also that the sensitivity would have to be 
increasing over time.  To get some sense of how European consumer preferences have 
been evolving over time, the European demand functions were calibrated each year by 
holding κ constant and allowing the ϕ parameter to change. Figure 14 shows the results 
of this exercise, revealing the meaning of the assumptions in the demand system model 
when consumers are sensitive to their perception of GM products.  
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Figure 14: Representation of φ, ρw overtime 
 
To interpret the figure, recall first that φ is an index of population perception of 
GM products. The larger the value, the lower soybean consumption is going to be. For 
example, a value of 1 means that the representative customer is very apprehensive about 
using GM products, and if there is no way for him to identify what the goods are made of, 
he will just not purchase them. On the other hand, a value of zero means that the 
consumer is unaffected by the presence of GM products and his decision process will be 
solely based on prices.  
Second, note that this calibration procedure presumes that if it were not for GM 
products, the European demand would not have shifted. The main underlying 
assumptions are that the income allocation to food purchases have not changed, which is 
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reasonable, but also that substitute products prices have not changed relative to soybean 
prices. This assumption is more difficult to justify. A third assumption is that consumers’ 
preferences changed only with respect to their attitudes toward GM food.   
As in the U.S., European consumers were confronted with massive amounts of 
information concerning GMO products. However, Europeans are more sensitive to the 
issue, as shown by Gaskell et al., and they also have a higher scientific knowledge 
concerning GMOs than Americans. Because the introduction of GMOs is such a huge 
topic in Europe, there is hardly a day without some sort of public debate or propaganda 
manifestation that will reinforce one feeling or another toward the adoption of GMO 
products. All of this contributes to shaping consumers’ demand by shifting it based on the 
consumer’s perception of what the soybean he consumes is made of. That is the reason 
why world adoption rate is used as a proxy to describe consumers approximation of what 
the mix of soybean they are consuming is made of. 
The κs in the demand functions are scalars; because the true κ is unknown, I 
simply use the largest one (corresponding to the calibration year 2001) as the basis to 
calculate the different values of φ for all the different years for soybean grains. The main 
purpose here is to gain insight on the way φ likely evolved over time rather to estimate its 
true value. 
Figure 14 shows an initial decline of φ, which could be interpreted as an 
acceptance of the technology, and then a slight raise after 2001. This increase in the later 
years may reflect either a slow growing concern from the population, or some other 
factors that we have assumed constant while they are not. Gaskell et al. (2003) argue also 
that from 1999 through 2002 the European population appeared to be more accepting of 
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the new biotechnology, which would be consistent with our findings. Care needs to be 
taken in interpreting the numerical values in the results; while consistent with previous 
studies, they may have been affected by other factors not included here. 
Although some of the numbers presented are subject to the influence of the 
assumptions made during the calibration process, the story told would hold true for other 
assumptions as well. A sensitivity analysis was conducted and presented in Appendix A, 
B, C, and D. The assumptions on some key parameters were tested and the same pattern 
was found in the results. The U.S., as an early adopter and home of the 
monopoly/innovator, gains from the technology while late adopters like Brazil incurred a 
welfare loss. Other countries, such as Europe, benefited from the technology even though 
its producers could not adopt, as it faced lower prices.  The U.S. price support program in 
the form of LDPs had an impact on the outcome of the model in all cases.  
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CHAPTER 6 - Conclusions 
 
Technological changes have always been subject to numerous debates and studies 
to establish if and how much they benefit society. Glyphosate resistant soybean is such a 
technological improvement that has generated numerous studies attempting to measure its 
welfare gains. There are obvious gains from adopting the technology from a production 
efficiency standpoint, as it significantly decreases production cost and simplifies weed 
control management. However, with some consumers being reluctant to embrace such a 
change, especially in Europe, it is not obvious that overall welfare gains are positive. This 
study attempts to address some shortcomings perceived in recent economic literature, 
namely the disregard of consumers’ demand responses and the lack of analysis over time. 
This study builds on previous research, mainly Moschini et al. (2000) and 
Sobolevsky et al. (2005), to measure welfare gains in the soybean complex in the period 
1998-2005. It creates a partial equilibrium model where supply and demand functions are 
calibrated to observed prices and quantities as well as the adoption rate, the cost savings 
provided by the technology, and production information such as yield, and harvested 
acreage. The model developed considers 6 different regions, namely the U.S., Europe, 
China, Argentina, Brazil and the rest of the world, and develops for each one of them a 
supply function and three demand functions for soybean grain, meal, and oil. Once those 
are calibrated, the gains for the different players in the industry are computed. 
Results reveal the distribution of gains among the different groups. Assuming first 
that consumers’ preferences are unaffected by the introduction of GM technology, results 
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indicate that consumers in all regions gained from it. The gains to consumers in different 
countries are proportional to their shares of world demand. The deficiency payments in 
the U.S. during the early years of the study period enhanced the gain to consumers, so 
that the growth in consumer surplus was disproportionate to the growth in the technology 
adoption rate during that time. Producers in some countries gained from the technology 
while in other countries they lost, depending on whether they adopted it. Countries like 
the U.S. or Argentina, who were the early adopters, clearly saw an increase in their 
producer surplus from the adoption of the technology. Brazil, which delayed adopting the 
technology for political reasons, faced a significant loss due to lower prices without the 
benefit of enjoying a cost-saving production technology. The innovator that developed 
the Glyphosate resistant technology was given a patent, which made it a monopoly. The 
gain realized by this entity increased over time as the adoption rate increased.  
At the national level, the U.S. is without doubt the country that benefited the most 
from the technology. There are several reasons for this. First, the U.S. has the largest 
acreage of soybean grown using the Glyphosate resistant technology. Second, the U.S. 
consumer base for soybean products is larger than in the other regions. Finally, the 
monopoly is a U.S.-based company and therefore some of the gain captured abroad by 
the monopoly funnels back to the U.S. But other countries have also benefited from the 
technology. Argentina’s benefits came from the fact that it adopted the technology early, 
at an even faster rate than the U.S. Brazil, on the other hand, which has a large number of 
soybean acres, did not benefit as much from the innovation because adoption was delayed 
and there were not enough gains generated on the consumer side to overcome the loss on 
the producer side. Europe (assuming here that preferences did not change) and other large 
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importing countries benefited from the technology even though their smaller production 
sectors suffered from their inability to use the technology. Because consumers in these 
countries faced lower prices due to more efficient production abroad, the technology 
generated a gain that overcame the loss on the producer side. 
While the distribution of the gains found is similar to the ones found in previous 
studies, the gains appear to be in general larger. The driving factor behind the valuation 
of the gains is the change of profitability between the different technologies. The 
difference in profit per acre drives the overall gains to the different players of the industry 
up or down. Recommendations by the Kansas State University Extension services 
concerning weed management program resulted in profitability differences somewhat 
larger than the ones used in previous studies. Appendix B presents what the results would 
have been if the profitability of the new technology per acre was different. While the 
overall gains are decreased for each player in the industry, the story over time remains the 
same.  
Does it matter from a U.S. standpoint what European consumers think about the 
new technology? It does matter for the size of the gain but probably not to determine if it 
is a positive or negative gain. This study shows that from 2002 to 2005, even if the 
European consumer completely stopped purchasing soybean, the U.S. as a whole still 
would have benefited from the technology. For the earlier period 1998-2001, the study 
shows that if Europe had decreased its demand from 35% to 48% (depending on the 
year), the U.S. as a whole could have been made worse off by the technology. This 
results from the cost faced by the U.S. government for the LDP program at that time, but 
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also from the fact that less acreage was planted using that technology, which made the 
cost savings smaller.  
This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it shows the gain 
distribution over time to the different actors resulting from the technology adoption. 
Second, it attempts to isolate over time the resulting effects that a demand shift in Europe 
from the adoption of the technology could have had. It also measures how large the shift 
would have had to have been to make the U.S. as a whole worse off because of the 
introduction of herbicide resistant soybean. 
Those findings suggest that, despite a potential loss of some of the European 
demand, it is still very likely that the U.S. as a whole benefited from the innovation. By 
assuming that demand was unaffected by the presence of GM products, the results are the 
upper bound of the gains. More research aimed at estimating European consumers’ 
response to GM food would prove itself insightful and would improve the gains 
calculation presented in this study. 
Research on the optimal patent length could nicely be combined with this study to 
assess the pricing strategy of the monopoly as well as the effect it has on overall gains. 
Patents are valid instruments only if they can be enforced. Any kind of derogation to the 
rule obviously affects the patent holder as well the socially optimal length of the patent. 
Glyphosate resistant soybean patent violations in South America have been the source of 
various lawsuits filed by the patent holder. Such violations have significant effects on the 
distribution of the gains among the industry players. Indeed, if producers in South 
America are not forced to pay, or pay only partially for the property rights attached to the 
seed, it gives them a competitive advantage over their U.S. counterparts. The model 
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presented here could provide some valuable insights concerning the importance of those 
gains, as well as what situation would be likely if the IPR were enforced in South 
America. For instance, this model could be applied to address questions such as how the 
gain from enforcing those rules would be distributed between U.S. producers and the 
monopoly. 
Another potential research avenue lies in understanding the dynamics of the 
monopoly gains. Figure 15 shows the monopoly and U.S. producer gains from a different 
perspective, where the data from table 8 were reorganized to show the growth in gains in 
percentage terms since 1998. 
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Figure 15: Change in gains from 1998 for U.S. producers and monopoly 
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Figure 15 conveys some of the perceptions of producers who feel that they did not 
gain as much from the technology compared to the monopoly. While U.S. producers’ 
grain from the technology was quite flat since 1998, despite more acres being planted to 
Glyphosate resistant soybean, the monopoly gains increased exponentially since 1998. 
This raises interesting questions about the pricing strategy followed by the monopoly, in 
terms of how prices were set over time and whether those prices in fact maximized the 
innovator’s profit. 
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Appendix A 
The graphs and table presented below were computed every year by calibrating 
transportation cost based on observed price differential of soybean grain between 
countries. Because numerous countries have some kind of tariff on oil, Moschni et al. 
simply added an extra $30 in transportation cost per metric ton for the E.U., China and 
ROW. This is the assumption used in the model above, while here, the price differentials 
reflect the observed differences in regional prices every year. Of course, the observed 
difference in prices between any two regions varies from one year to the next, implying 
that the ti,j parameters in this model are not constant. International data were unavailable 
from the FAOSTAT, therefore calculations stopped in 2004.  
 
Table 10: Change in welfare from glyphosate resistant soybean, by country and market 
sector, with different yearly transportation cost 1998-2005 ($ million)  
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
US PS 480.73$      652.21$      567.86$      726.00$      505.78$      509.06$      600.84$      
EU PS (7.19)$         (8.22)$         (6.32)$         (8.36)$         (4.25)$         (2.24)$         (4.47)$         
China PS (70.25)$       (95.85)$       (81.31)$       (97.69)$       (78.78)$       (54.38)$       (98.64)$       
ROW PS (81.30)$       (114.08)$     (90.34)$       (103.08)$     (81.92)$       (70.55)$       (117.73)$     
Argentina PS 92.19$        128.63$      197.03$      222.91$      323.71$      313.30$      391.53$      
Brazil PS (147.73)$     (235.56)$     (213.52)$    (282.15)$    (259.13)$    (171.24)$     (262.55)$     
US CS 193.32$      183.95$      223.98$      275.00$      210.73$      353.84$      277.02$      
EU CS 121.78$      127.75$      175.08$      219.35$      163.02$      278.37$      192.43$      
China CS 107.18$      120.62$      143.30$      179.45$      185.66$      301.00$      259.65$      
ROW CS 246.79$      239.84$      298.58$      383.92$      302.84$      491.60$      391.06$      
Argentina CS 6.57$          8.34$          8.97$          12.86$        11.36$        15.41$        15.25$        
Brazil CS 59.23$        59.82$        69.43$       88.09$       72.53$       118.55$      96.57$       
Monopoly 112.56$      133.38$      160.54$     175.85$     183.46$     252.24$      300.63$      
US Gov (348.60)$     (529.24)$     (433.16)$    (566.63)$    -$           -$            -$            
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Figure 16: Producer surplus gains ($ million) with different yearly transportation cost 
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Figure 17: Consumer surplus gains over time ($million) with different yearly 
transportation cost 
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Welfare gains by country
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Figure 18: Welfare gains ($ million) by country with different yearly transportation cost 
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Welfare changes in the United States
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Figure 19: Welfare change ($ million) in the U.S. by sector, with different yearly 
transportation cost 
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Appendix B 
The figures and tables below were computed by assuming that the profit advantage of 
Glyphosate resistant soybean, Δπ, was only half of what was used in the base calibration. 
 
Table 11: Change in welfare from glyphosate resistant soybean, by country and market 
sector, with ½ profit change 1998-2005 ($ million)  
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
US PS 242.06$      329.41$      286.31$      366.77$      248.42$      209.97$      301.08$      229.35$      
EU PS (3.43)$         (3.69)$         (3.17)$         (4.12)$         (2.21)$         (1.54)$         (2.25)$         (2.58)$         
China PS (33.70)$       (43.07)$       (41.10)$       (48.46)$       (41.03)$       (37.43)$       (49.78)$       (51.44)$       
ROW PS (38.85)$       (51.22)$       (45.51)$       (50.95)$       (42.56)$       (48.55)$       (59.38)$       (65.60)$       
Argentina PS 48.24$        72.07$        98.71$        113.32$      161.13$      137.66$      197.47$      169.26$      
Brazil PS (70.58)$       (105.19)$     (107.10)$    (138.69)$    (131.62)$    (119.45)$    (130.12)$     (42.50)$      
US CS 93.06$        121.93$      113.53$      136.99$      109.38$      97.13$        139.77$      139.65$      
EU CS 58.75$        88.42$        89.55$        110.04$      85.72$        76.05$        98.24$        101.40$      
China CS 51.44$        71.76$        72.56$        89.20$        96.11$        92.17$        130.79$      149.01$      
ROW CS 118.74$      155.13$      151.17$      191.04$      157.20$      142.31$      197.29$      207.46$      
Argentina CS 3.16$          4.43$          4.53$          6.38$          5.88$          6.13$          7.67$          8.56$          
Brazil CS 28.46$        38.85$        35.07$       43.79$       37.73$       35.02$       48.83$        49.75$       
Monopoly 112.60$      133.47$      160.62$     175.90$     183.90$     250.57$     301.25$      387.01$     
US Gov (170.17)$     (244.48)$     (221.78)$    (285.99)$    -$           -$           -$            -$            
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Figure 20: Producer surplus gains ($ million) with ½ profit change 
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Figure 21: Consumer surplus gains over time ($million) with ½ profit change 
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Welfare gains by country
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Figure 22: Welfare gains ($ million) by country with ½ profit change 
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Welfare changes in the United States
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Figure 23: Welfare change ($ million) in the U.S. by sector, with ½ profit change 
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Appendix C 
The figures and table below shows the results of reducing all demand elasticities (see 
Table 6 for original values) in half. 
 
Table 12: Change in welfare from glyphosate resistant soybean, by country and market 
sector, with ½ demand elasticities 1998-2005 ($ million)  
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
US PS 480.73$      652.21$      567.86$      726.00$      433.31$      370.48$      515.45$      374.52$      
EU PS (8.96)$         (9.43)$         (8.06)$         (10.38)$       (5.19)$         (3.54)$         (5.34)$         (6.05)$         
China PS (88.13)$       (110.18)$     (104.50)$     (122.22)$     (96.55)$       (85.98)$       (118.28)$     (120.81)$     
ROW PS (101.58)$     (131.02)$     (115.73)$     (128.51)$     (100.15)$     (111.51)$     (141.08)$     (154.05)$     
Argentina PS 70.13$        109.53$      158.51$      179.04$      291.09$      249.52$      354.01$      296.64$      
Brazil PS (185.97)$     (271.12)$     (274.69)$    (353.02)$    (311.65)$    (275.74)$    (320.31)$     (141.39)$     
US CS 241.56$      310.36$      287.01$      342.76$      256.69$      221.84$      331.41$      326.93$      
EU CS 154.77$      220.94$      225.16$      275.49$      201.47$      174.79$      232.60$      235.23$      
China CS 133.45$      182.30$      183.29$      223.16$      225.39$      210.25$      309.91$      348.86$      
ROW CS 307.76$      394.96$      382.26$      477.86$      368.72$      325.28$      467.45$      485.36$      
Argentina CS 8.13$          11.37$        11.47$        15.96$        13.79$        13.96$        18.20$        20.14$        
Brazil CS 73.43$        99.57$        88.90$       109.55$     88.52$       79.83$       115.83$      116.70$     
Monopoly 112.69$      133.48$      160.79$     176.02$     184.61$     249.88$     302.95$      387.85$     
US Gov (428.42)$     (593.24)$     (535.16)$    (679.11)$    -$           -$           -$            -$            
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Figure 24: Producer surplus gains ($ million) with ½ demand elasticities 
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Figure 25: Consumer surplus gains over time ($million) with ½ demand elasticities 
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Welfare gains by country
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Figure 26: Welfare gains ($ million) by country with ½ demand elasticities 
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Welfare changes in the United States
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Figure 27: Welfare change ($ million) in the U.S. by sector with ½ demand elasticities 
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Appendix D 
The figures and table below shows the results of increasing all demand elasticities (see 
Table 6 for original values) by a factor of 2. 
 
Table 13: Change in welfare from glyphosate resistant soybean, by country and market 
sector, with 2 times demand elasticities 1998-2005 ($ million)  
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
US PS 480.73$      652.21$      567.86$      726.00$      562.54$      477.16$      691.24$      554.49$      
EU PS (4.89)$         (5.50)$         (4.71)$         (6.25)$         (3.54)$         (2.53)$         (3.57)$         (4.11)$         
China PS (48.09)$       (64.22)$       (61.10)$       (73.57)$       (65.86)$       (61.41)$       (78.94)$       (82.05)$       
ROW PS (55.42)$       (76.36)$       (67.67)$       (77.36)$       (68.31)$       (79.65)$       (94.16)$       (104.63)$     
Argentina PS 119.89$      173.43$      230.20$      265.77$      349.72$      302.14$      430.48$      380.74$      
Brazil PS (100.53)$     (157.15)$     (159.06)$    (210.66)$    (210.97)$    (195.46)$    (195.37)$     (17.77)$      
US CS 132.16$      180.06$      167.48$      206.13$      173.99$      158.92$      219.20$      220.53$      
EU CS 82.89$        131.87$      132.62$      165.72$      136.39$      124.02$      154.39$      161.01$      
China CS 73.13$        106.14$      107.18$      134.34$      153.08$      150.89$      205.43$      235.54$      
ROW CS 168.90$      229.25$      223.22$      287.79$      250.37$      232.75$      309.92$      328.05$      
Argentina CS 4.50$          6.51$          6.66$          9.59$          9.35$          10.05$        12.02$        13.48$        
Brazil CS 40.53$        57.16$        51.65$       65.87$       60.01$       57.35$       76.53$        78.46$       
Monopoly 112.50$      133.46$      160.41$     175.75$     182.95$     251.55$     299.00$      385.89$     
US Gov (247.43)$     (375.35)$     (342.84)$    (453.05)$    -$           -$           -$            -$            
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Figure 28: Producer surplus gains ($ million) with 2 times demand elasticities 
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Figure 29: Consumer surplus gains over time ($million) with 2 times demand elasticities 
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Welfare gains by country
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Figure 30: Welfare gains ($ million) by country with 2 times demand elasticities 
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Welfare changes in the United States
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Figure 31: Welfare change ($ million) in the U.S. by sector, with 2 times demand 
elasticities 
 
 
